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ELECTION, OPERATION AND TERMINATION
OF A SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATION
By RONALD R. HRUSOFFt
I.
INTRODUCTION
ECONOMISTS AND BUSINESS writers have complained
about the unfairness of the corporate income tax for years.
Generally, their cries have gone unheeded. In a half-hearted attempt
to remedy the problem and to ease the tax burden on the small busi-
nessman, President Eisenhower recommended in his 1953 budget mes-
sage to Congress:
Small business should be able to operate under whatever form
of organization is desired for their particular circumstances, with-
out incurring unnecessary tax penalties. To secure this result,
I recommend that corporations with a small number of active
stockholders be given the option to be taxed as partnerships and
that certain partnerships be given the option to be taxed as
corporations.'
The President's enthusiasm was not shared by all factions of Congress.
His proposal was rejected completely by the House Ways and Means
Committee;2 however, the Senate drafted rather elaborate provisions
covering both corporations and partnerships. All but that portion
covering partnerships wishing to be taxed as corporations' was
killed in conference.' The 1954 provisions,5 received little enthusiasm
from the tax bar. Three years later, while considering the technical
t B.A., 1957, University of California (Berkeley), LL.B., 1963, LL.M., 1965,
Georgetown University; member, D.C. and Virginia Bars.
1. Eisenhower, 1953 Budget Message to the 83d Cong., Tax Recommendation
number 16, January 1953. Mellon, when he was Secretary of the Treasury, made a
similar recommendation in 1927. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 140 (1954).
2. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) ; S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
118 (1954). "These provisions are not in the House bill."
3. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1954).
4. H.R. Rep. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1954).
5. 68A Stat. 350 (1954), 26 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964).
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amendments to the 1954 Code, the House suggested the partner-
ship provisions be repealed. 6 The Senate Finance Committee not
only disagreed7 but offered a re-drafted version of the previously-
rejected corporations-taxed-as-partnerships provisions." The Senate
managers prevailed in conference, 9 and what is now Subchapter S
came into being as part of the 1958 Technical Amendments Act.'0
A wave of criticism followed. Mortimer Caplin," Professor
Anthoine' 2 and the editors of Mertens 13 suggested the section should
be repealed. One writer compared this provision to a fish lure; he
concluded the taxpayer, like the fish, would end up in hot water. 4
Another told us "The writer of the old serial, 'The Perils of Pauline,'
was a piker in fabricating perilous situations when compared with
those which the authors of the tax law manufacture for the tax
lawyer."' 5 Nevertheless, six years have passed, the section has been
thrice amended,' e and at least 100,000 elections have been made under
it.'" It would seem that Subchapter S is here to stay.
Although most businesses will find it more profitable not to
elect or to remain in the partnership form,' 8 an election may profitably
be made in at least four situations. 9 They are:
6. H.R. Rep. No. 775, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36, 92-93 (1957).
7. S. Rep. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d -Sess. 87-89, 216-26 (1958) . the enact-
ment of a provision of this type is desirable because it permits business to select the
form of business organization desired, without the necessity of taking into account
major differences in tax consequence." Id. at 87.
8. See 7 MXRTENs, LAW o FEDSRAL INcoME TAXATION § 41B.01 (1962) ; Moore
& Sorlien, Adventures in Subchapter S and Section 1244, 14 TAX L. Rzv. 453, 457
(1959).
9. H.R. Rep. No. 2632, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1958).
10. 72 Stat. 1650, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1371-77 (1964).
11. Caplin, Subchapter S vs. Partnership: A Proposed Legislative Program, 46
VA. L. Rev. 61, 80 (1960).
12. Anthoine, Federal Tax Legislation of 1958: The Corporate Election and
Collapsible Amendment, 58 COLUM. L. Rv. 1146, 1175 (1958) "... subchapter S
is bound to be a 'gimmick' section."
13. 7 MERTXNS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION § 41B.44 (1962).
14. Willis, Incorporate and Elect Subchapter S? Pros and Cons for Proprietors,
Partners, 11 J. TAXATION 66 (1959).
15. Hobbet, Subchapter S and Family Tax Planning, 10 J. TAXATION 136 (1959).
16. 73 Stat. 699 (1959), 26 U.S.C. §§ 1371(c), 1374(b) (1964) ; 75 Stat. 64
(1961), 26 U.S.C. § 1372(g) (Supp. V, 1964) ; 78 Stat. 112 (1964), 26 U.S.C. §§
1371(d), 1375(e) (1964). [Hereafter references to the statutes at large with one or
two exceptions will be omitted.]
17. As of July 1962 there were 106,048 active and 958 inactive Subchapter S cor-
porations filing returns with the Internal Revenue Service. Statistics of Income
Taxation for Corporations 1961-1962, IRS Pub. No. 16, 4, 34 (1963).
18. Lourie, Subchapter S After Three Years of Operation, 18 TAX L. REv. 99
(1962) believes in "a large number of situations, factors other than considerations of
federal income ttx consequences deprive individuals of a free choice of business form."
19. Moore & Sorlien, supra note 8 at 459 express the belief that an election should
only be made if one of the following three reasons exists:
(1) If the business is a truly small one, with comparatively steady income
anticipated and stockholders who do not have substantial outside incom e;
(2) If stockholders have substantial outside income, and a sizeable loss for
the year is anticipated;
(3) If sophisticated, competently advised stockholders wish to take advantage
of one of the 'gimmicks' allowed, probably unintentionally, by Congress.
[VOL. 11 : p. 1
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(1) A partnership electing to receive corporate benefits;
(2) A corporation electing to prevent excessive salaries from
being disallowed as a business expense;
(3) A corporation electing to take advantage of lower individual
rates ;20
(4) A corporation electing before liquidating or selling certain
assets.
A partnership - if it may continue to be taxed as one - may
wish to incorporate to obtain certain corporate benefits. Once it is
incorporated, the shareholder-employees may participate in qualified
pension, profit sharing, stock bonus,2' or group life insurance plans,
22
and the heirs may receive up to $5,000 in death benefits.23 These
benefits, when closely analyzed in the light of recent amendments
(which have either extended them to non-corporate employers or
have destroyed them)2 4 turn out to be largely of peripheral value.
The grief accompanying a change from a partnership to a corporation
may not equal the anticipated benefits. The limited value gained from




The second and third situations are the reverse of each other.
Weaver Airline Personnel School, Inc. v. Bookwaltero illustrates the
second. In that case taxpayers had invested less than $15,000 in a
corporation that operated an airline employees training school. Each
owner was drawing a salary in excess of $92,000 within five years.
20. With the recent reduction of the normal rate (tax on first $25,000 of profit)
from 30 to 22 per cent this reason loses much of its appeal. § 11 (2).
21. § 401.
22. §§ 105-06.
23. § 101(b) (2). See Plowden-Wardlaw, Subchapter S and Partnerships as
Vehicles Governing Family Business, N.Y.U. 21sT INST. ON FtD. TAX 981, 989-90
(1963).
24. § 401. As the 1962 amendments to section 401(c) allow self-employed to
participate in this program it is no longer as desirable as it once was to incorporate
for the "fringe benefits." For an extremely good article on the 1958 version of the
bill see Rapp, The Quest for Tax Equality for Private Pension Plans: A Short
History of the Jenkins-Keough Bill, 14 TAX L. REv. 55 (1958); see also Caplin,
Income Tax Pressures on the Form of Business Organization: Is it Time for a
"Doing Business" Tax?, 47 VA. L. Rrv. 249, 251-52 (1961).
25. Caplin, supra note 11; Mulhern, Executive Compensation and Fringe Benefits,
40 TAXES 943 (1962) Willis, supra note 14. The problems arising under the restrictive
application of § 1361(d), United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), and
the Service's inartistically drafted regulations attempting to restrict the various cor-
porate benefits to bona fide corporations (Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1965)) are beyond
the scope of this article.
26. 218 F. Supp. 599 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
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To avoid a portion of their salary from being taxed first as corporate
profit and then as a dividend, the corporation elected to be taxed under
Subchapter S. The district court agreed that this election was highly
proper, for: "This subchapter permits small business corporations,
who qualify, to elect to be taxed, in effect, as partnerships. Under
such an election the reasonableness of salaries paid to stockholders
is not an issue."'27 As the 1964 income averaging provisions made no
mention of electing shareholders, 28 it would seem that an election
could be coupled with income averaging to spread earnings over a
greater period. While the new provisions are fairly restrictive they
do allow savings in extreme cases.29
27. Id. at 602; Lourie, supra note 18 at 104.
28. 78 Stat. 110 (1964), 26 U.S.C. §§ 1301-05 (1964) ; compare § 1303 with § 1371.
29. § 1301 provides in part "If an eligible individual has averagable income
for the computation year, and if the amount of such income exceeds $3,000, then the
tax imposed by section 1 for the computation year which is attributable to averagable
income shall be 5 times the increase in tax under such section which would result
from adding 20 percent of such income to the sum of - (1) 133% percent of average
base period income. . . ." Algebraically expressed:
(y, thru y, represent the previous 4 years, y, the present year)
1.33 ( y1 + y + y + y. ) x
a y5 - x
x + .2a = tentative taxable income
i = total tentative tax liability
i, = tax liability on x
i - ii = tax liability of .2 of the averagable income
5 (i - i,) = tax on total averagable income
5(i - i,) + i, = total final tax liability
H.R. Rep. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 112-13 (1963) states:
For most taxpayers ...the application of this averaging provision is relatively
simple. This can be illustrated by an example of an unmarried taxpayer having an
average base period income of $3,000 in the years 1961-64 and an adjusted taxable
income of $44,000 in 1965. The taxpayer in this case is eligible for averaging
since his 'averagable income' exceeds $3,000....
Since the averagable income is in excess of $3,000, the entire amount is
subject to averaging.
Computation of tax:
(a) 133 % percent of average base income ($3,000 X 1331/3 percent) $ 4,000
(b) Averagable income included in tentative tax base (% of $40,000) 8,000
(c) Tentative taxable income ... 12,000
(d) Total tentative tax liability (1965 rates under bill) 2,830
(e) Tax on $4,000 not subject to averaging .. . . .. 690
(f) Tax liability on % of averagable income2.. ...... 2,140
(g) Tax on total averagable income ($2,140 X 5) 10,700
(h) Total final tax liability (tax on $4,000 not subject to averaging
and $40,000 subject to averaging)------------- --........... 11,390
(i) Tax on $44,000 under 1965 rates without averaging---------_ 18,990
If a more realistic example is used it becomes evident that this section only allows
savings in very exceptional circumstances. Assume a base income (four year 1961-64
[VOL. 11 : p. 1
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The 1958 Senate Report3 ° described the third situation in the
following terms:
. . . [this provision] will be primarily beneficial to those individ-
uals who have marginal tax rates below the 52-percent corporate
rate (or 30-percent rate in the case of the smaller corporations)
where the earnings are left in the business ...
The owner does not need to leave the earnings in the business, as
suggested, to profit under this section. All that is required is a corpo-
ration with limited earnings and an owner with little or no income
except what he receives as dividends from the corporation. Of course,
if he can take his profit out as salary this provision is inapplicable
to him. A new venture, especially if initial losses are expected, might
begin operation as an electing corporation and then losses that might
otherwise be lost can be passed on to the owners and deducted from
their gross income."' When the corporation turns the corner and begins
to show a profit, the election may easily be revoked32 or terminated.8"
The fourth situation involves "one shot affairs." The election
is made to accomplish a specific task; the election is terminated when
the task is completed. For example, a corporation with three or four
rich shareholders and with substantial retained earnings may wish
to elect if it anticipates a loss year. Normally the loss would only be
reflected as a reduction in the corporation's earnings and profits
account, which may or may not affect future distributions. If the
firm is subsequently liquidated, any benefit derived from operating
losses has effectively been converted from the income to the capital
account. But if the firm elected to be taxed as a Subchapter S corpo-
average) of $10,000 and an adjusted income of $15,000 in 1965. The tax would work
out as follows:
(a) 133% percent of average base income ($10,000 X 133% percent) $13,300
(b) Averagable income included in tentative tax base (1A of $1,700) 340
(c) Tentative taxable incom e .......................................................--- - 13,640
(d) Total tentative tax liability (1965 rates under bill) . 3,420
(e) Tax on $13,300 not subject to averaging 3,298
(f) Tax liability on % of averagable income .. 122
(g) Tax on total averagable income ($122 X 5) --------..........------------- 610
(h) Total final tax liability (tax on $13,300 not subject to averaging
and $1,700 subject to averaging) -- --------........................- 3,908
(i) Tax on $15,000 under 1965 rates without averaging---- -------- 3,940
Thus, it can be seen that an increase of better than 50 percent must be realized before
the taxpayer benefits from income averaging - at least at the lower rates. See
Goldberg, Income Averaging under the Revenue Act of 1964, 74 YALE L.J. 450, 470-75
(1965); Schneider, Many Problems under Income Averaging, 22 J. TAXATION
44 (1965).
30. S. Rep. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1958) ; Note, Subchapter S of the
1954 Code, 33 ST. JOHN's L. Rev. 187, 194 (1958).
31. § 1374(a).
32. § 1372(e) (2).
33. § 1372(e) (1) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b) (3) (1960).
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ration, the loss could be saved. It would be passed directly on to the
shareholders and could be offset against their ordinary income.34
Subchapter S may also be beneficially used if the firm is about to sell
a portion of its assets at a capital gain. Normally the corporation
would be tapped for a capital gains tax, and then the stockholder
would be hit when the proceeds are distributed as dividends - this
time at regular income rates . 5 By electing before the sale, the only
tax will be a capital gains tax imposed on the shareholders. 36 One
point should be handled with care. While the corporation can terminate
the election with ease, 7 without the necessity of showing a business
purpose 8 (even though it knew termination, and possibly liquidation,
was imminent when it elected), a the termination will be carefully
scrutinized.' Revocation is a bit more difficult for it requires unani-
mous consent 41 and will not go into effect until the following year."
However these requirements are not burdensome in many cases.
Sales after election may profitably be made in a great variety
of situations. They will be discussed in detail in Section III. It is
sufficient, at this juncture, to note that the flexibility with which "one
shot affairs" may be handled is the most useful feature of
Subchapter S.43
Corporate owners, partners, or proprietors should reflect at con-
siderable length on the relative merits of each business form before an
election is attempted. While Subchapter S offers various advantages,
it imposes disadvantages as well. The electing partnership loses ad-
ministrative flexibility and becomes subject to state corporate income
taxes. 4  The corporation may be reinvesting all its earnings and the
owners may plan to eventually merge out or sell out. This course
may yield the owners a larger return than anything possible under
34. § 1374.
35. § 301(c) (1).
36. § 1375.
37. See infra and notes 45-61.
38. Patty, Qualification and Disqualification under Subchapter S, N.Y.U. 18TH
INST. oN F4D. TAX 661, 682-83 (1960).
39. Hauptman v. Director of Internal Revenue, 309 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 909 (1963).
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.13724(b) (3) (1960). See Stinson, Terminating the Election
under Subchapter S, N.Y.U. 18TH INST. ON FD. TAX 707, 709 (1960).
41. § 1372(e) (2).
42. § 1372(e) (2) (B) ; the revocation provisions have been criticized as "almost
meaningless" because of the ease of termination. Note, Optional Taxation of Closely
Held Corporations under the Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 72 HARV. L. Rebv.
710, 713 (1959).
43. Cf. Note, Subchapter S of the 1954 Code, 33 ST. JoHN's L. Rmv. 187, 203 (1958).
44. See P.H. STATn TAX GuIDF 213 (1964) for a chart indicating the extent that
various states follow the federal tax code. See also Kalupa, Subchapter S Election
May Cause Increase in State Taxes, 10 J. TAXATION 137 (1959).
[VOL. 11 : p. 1
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Subchapter S. Perhaps a banner year is expected. If so, it is of no
advantage to be operating as a Subchapter S corporation; the flat




A partnership or corporation must meet a series of fairly simple
mechanical tests to operate as a Subchapter S corporation. At the
outset, a partnership or proprietorship must incorporate; Subchapter
S is limited to domestic corporations which are not part of an affiliated
group.45 The corporation must file form 2553 with the district di-
rector,46 and each shareholder must file a written consent to the elec-
tion. In contrast to other portions of the Code,48 one holdout
destroys the election.49 There must be less than eleven individual,"0
non-alien, 5' shareholders. 2 Although a husband and wife holding stock
as community property,"s or as joint tenants, tenants by the entirety,
or tenants in common are counted as one, not two shareholders,54
each must file written consent to the election. 5 The corporation may
not have more than one class of stock,56 derive more than 80 percent
45. § 1371(a).
46. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-2(a) (1960).
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-3(a) (1964). Consent once given is binding and may
not be withdrawn after the corporation makes an election. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-
1 (a) (2) (iv) (a) (1956) (partnership electing not to be taxed under Subchapter K).
48. § 333(c) (1) ; § 337(d) ; cf. § 1361 (f).
49. § 1372(a). Subsection (f) of the 1954 bill would have allowed an election if 80
percent of the shareholders consented. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 454-
55 (1954).
50. § 1371(a (1_-(2).
51. § 1371(a)
52. § 1371 (a) (1). All shareholders must be individuals or estates. Corporations,
partnerships, trusts or voting trusts are not permissible shareholders; nominees, agents,
guardians, custodians or usufructs are. Treas. Regs. §§ 1.1371-1(d) (1), 1.1371-1(e)
(1960) Rev. Rul. 64-249, 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 332. Care must be taken that the
magic number 10 is not exceeded by a guardian holding stock for several beneficiaries.
The beneficiary, not the guardian, is considered the shareholder. Treas. Reg. §
1.1371-1 (d) (1960).
53. § 1371(c) (1).
54. § 1371 (c) (2).
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-3(a) (1964). These rules have been strictly interpreted,
Simons v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 744 (D. Conn. 1962); J. William Frentz, 44
T.C. No. 43 (1965) ; William Prestcoe, 40 T.C. 195 (1963).
56. § 1371 (a) (4). This does not mean merely that the corporation may not issue
preferred and common; it may not issue two types of common. "Thus, a difference
as to voting rights, dividend rights, or liquidation preferences ...will disqualify a
corporation. . . . if an instrument purporting to be a debt obligation is actually
stock, it will constitute a second class of stock." Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1960).
The election will also be lost if one shareholder gives another an irrevocable proxy,
as this will create voting and non-voting stock. Rev. Rul. 63-226, 1962-3 CUM. BULL.
341; cf. Catalina Homes, Inc., 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1361 (1964) ; See Weinstein,
Stockholder Agreements and Subchapter S Corporations, 19 TAX L. Rgv. 391 (1964).
FALL 1965]
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of its gross receipts from sources outside the United States,5" nor
receive more than 20 percent of its income "from royalties, rents,
dividends, interest, annuities, and sales or exchanges of stock or
securities. '5'  The election is terminated automatically if any of these
conditions are not met. 9 The only penalty suffered is that the cor-
poration may not make a new election for five years6" - but for good
cause, the Commissioner may waive this requirement."1
The incorporation of a partnership normally is tax-free.62 Only
two simple conditions must be met: the partners must receive 80
percent of the stock, 3 and the corporation may not exchange any
stock or securities for services "rendered or to be rendered."0 4 The
corporation takes the partnership's basis for the property transferred
to it. 5 When the incorporation is carried on by wealthy individuals
under the guidance of a tax attorney, the incorporation generally
serves, and rightly so, as an occasion to rearrange the firm's assets.
The "normal" situation vanishes; the "normal" tax problems appear.
If at all possible, the exchange should be an occasion for re-
moving capital from the business. If left with the firm, it will be
capitalized and locked in. As the partners have already included
earnings and profits on their tax returns, all earnings may be re-
moved tax-free. Earnings represented by cash and accounts receivable
present no problem; they simply are not transferred from the partner-
ship to the corporation. Often earnings are tied up in fixed assets,
or the business cannot function if cash is removed. Here a storm
of problems blows up. Taxpayers have attempted - without much
success - to get cash out by several methods. One method was to
strip the corporation of all cash, and then prior to transfer, mortgage
the assets or sell and lease back some property. After transfer the
The Commissioner grudgingly agreed that stock issued to the Federal Housing Com-
missioner as required by 24 C.F.R. § 207.18(c) will not terminate the election. Rev.
Rul. 64-309, 1962-4 Cum. BULL. 333.
57. § 1372(e) (4).
58. § 1372(e) (5) ; see United States v. 525 Co., 342 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1965) for
an illustration of the Commissioner's eagerness to seize on the smallest technical point
in an attempt to force a termination of the election.
59. §§ 1372(e) (1), 1372(e) (4), 1372(e) (5).
60. § 1372(f).
61. Treas. Regs. §§ 1.1372-5(a) (1960), 1.1372-5(c) (1964).
62. § 351(a).
63. § 368(c). Actually the partners need not receive 80 percent of the stock; all
that is required is that the persons contributing property compositely receive 80 per-
cent of the stock. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1 (1955).
64. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1 (a)(i) (1955). If a person donates both property and
services the court will apportion the value of each and only allow tax-free treatment
to that portion representing the property interest. United States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d
487, 490 (5th Cir. 1964) ; cf. James C. Hamrick, 43 T.C. 21, 34-35 (1964) ; see
Herwitz, Allocation of Stock between Services and Capital in the Organication of a
Closed Corporation, 75 HARV. L. RFv. 1098 (1962).
65. § 358(a).
[VOL. 11 : p. 1
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corporation would borrow working capital from its stockholders or
from a commercial lending institution - perhaps with its notes
guaranteed by the shareholders. As an alternative to draining the
corporation of cash, the owners would take back stock and securities,
rather than just stock, from the corporation. The corporation would
then redeem the securities at its convenience. These tactics have all
been attacked. Section 357(a) allows the corporation to assume out-
standing debt along with assets it receives. However, if it is found
that placing the debt on the assets was part of a plan to avoid income
taxes" or served no business purpose,"7 the assumption of the partner's
debt will be considered money received by him on the exchange18 and
will be taxed to him as a dividend. The debt will be taxed to him as a
dividend. 9 Section 357(c) imposes a further qualification. If the sum
of the liabilities exceeds the basis of the property transferred, the excess
is treated as gain. This provision prevents cash from being taken out
through the device of a "quickie" mortgage. A sale and lease-back will
occasion a capital gains tax on the excess of the sale price over basis,
turning a tax-free exchange into a taxable occasion. Borrowing capi-
tal or issuing debt instruments to the shareholders may not be found
to be debts at all, but in fact equity. The corporation then is said to
be "thinly-incorporated." A "thinly-incorporated" firm's deduction
for debt interest will be disallowed.7° Any redemptions will be treated
as dividends or as a return of capital depending on the state of the
earnings and profits account.7 ' The regulations provide even harsher
treatment for a Subchapter S corporation. "If an instrument purport-
ing to be a debt obligation . .. [is found to be stock] it will constitute
a second class of stock"72 and the election will be terminated.73 This
provision is without direct support in the Code;"4 for this reason it
66. § 357(b) (1) (A).
67. § 357(b) (1) (B).
68. § 357(b); see BIrKER, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAR4HOLDERS 86-89 (1959).
69. § 301 (b) (1) (A).
70. Wilbur Sec. Co., 31 T.C. 938, 948-52 (1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.
1960) ; cf. J. A. Maurer, Inc., 30 T.C. 1273 (1958).
71. Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957).
72. Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1960). Immediately after Subchapter S was en-
acted Manly (Election under Subchapter S Can Eliminate Thin Incorporafion
Problems, 8 J. TAXATION 322, 323 (1958)) expressed the view that securities found
to be equity should not be deemed a sicond class of stock; they should merely be
added to the equity account. By failing to take this approach another stumbling block
was added to the election process.
73. § 1371(a) (4).
74. Compare § 1371 (a) (4) "... 'small business corporation' means a domestic
corporation . . . which does not . . . have more than one class of stock" with Treas.
Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1960) "If an instrument purporting to be a debt obligation is
actually stock, it will constitute a second class of stock."
FALL 1965]
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has been criticized by the commentators75 and the Tax Court.70 Put
to a direct test it would not come as a surprise if the courts declared
this section invalid and applied the same standards to Subchapter S
corporations as they do to all other corporations.
The early cases dealing with "thin-incorporations" were princi-
pally concerned with taxpayers' attempts to put equity capital into
the firm under the guise of bonded indebtedness. These instruments
attempted to straddle the line between equity and debt. During the
late 1930's and the early 1940's, a number of corporations came out
of reorganizations with some type of hybrid security included in their
capital structure. Generally they provided that interest need be paid
only if earned. With these instruments in mind it seemed reasonable
that a company could issue similar securities at its inception. The
courts had little difficulty distinguishing the bona fide reorganization
issue from the "tax-avoidance special." The latter was always dis-
allowed.
7
Taxpayers turned from this rebuke to true "thin-incorporations."
While the typical manufacturer has 30 or 40 percent of his capital
structure represented by debt, and a well-managed utility may have as
much as 60 percent, firms were being incorporated with 80, 90 or 95
percent debt. From 194678 until the mid 1950's, high debt ratios
were frequently challenged.79 Little consideration was given to other
factors during this period. After the 6th Circuit decided Gooding v.
Commissioner80 in 1956, the courts have begun to look at subjective
factors. Cases are examined today that would have been off-handedly
75. Supra notes 11-15.
76. Catalina Homes, Inc., 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1366 (1964).
77. John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946) ; compare Commissioner
v. Schmoll Fils Associated, Inc., 110 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1940) with Commissioner v.
O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1935). For an extensive discussion of this
group of cases see Weis, The Labyrinth of the Thin Corporation, 40 TAxXs 568,
570-71 (1962) ; see generally, Bittker, op. cit. supra, note 68 at 113-17. This problem
is not unique to the debt-equity situation. Cf. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S.
344 (1935) (attempt to straddle the line between a corporation and a partnership) ;
Smith v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1963) (association - taxed as a cor-
poration, partnership or employee-employer relationship); Commissioner v. North
Am. Bond, 122 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 70 (1942) ; Commis-
sioner v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 122 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1941) (trust or association).
78. 326 U.S. 521 (1946). The courts began to think in terms of debt ratios after
Mr. Justice Reed stated: "As material amounts of capital were invested in stock,
we need not consider the effect of extreme situations such as nominal stock invest-
ments and an obviously excessive debt structure." Id. at 526.
79. The Tax Court finally determined that a ratio of 3% to 1 was acceptable,
Ruspyn Corp., 18 T.C. 769 (1952), acq., 1952-2 Cum. BULL. 3; in all subsequent cases
it refused to find illegality if the taxpayer kept the ratio below 4 to 1. The Fifth
Circuit rejected the debt-equity approach and looked instead to the taxpayer's intent;
of necessity, it examined a variety of circumstances. Sun Properties, Inc. v. United
States, 220 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Rowan v. United States, 219 F.2d 51, 55 (5th
Cir. 1955). See Weis, supra, note 77 at 578-80.
80. 23 T.C. 408 (1954), aff'd, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
1031 (1957).
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accepted or rejected a few years ago."' The courts have developed
a multitude of tests82 - generally to be read together - to deter-
mine whether they should allow any given capital structure. By doing
so they are in the main stream of American jurisprudence and are
approaching the problem in the same manner in which they have dealt
with antitrust83 or licensing cases.8 4  Perhaps fairness has been pro-
moted. However, in a merger case, the effect on the national market,
the local market, suppliers, consumers and competitors, or in a "thin-
incorporation" proceeding,85 the question whether the company had
sufficient earnings to pay off the debt when due, had a sinking fund,
or borrowed additional operating capital destroys both workability
and predictability. For this reason both the antitrust 6 and the tax bars
have pushed for definite standards. The Advisory Group to the Mills
Committee8 7 and the American Law Institute"8 recommended that
81. Consumers Credit Rural Elec. Co-op Corp. v. Commissioner, 319 F.2d 475
(6th Cir. 1963).
82. Motel Co. v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 445, 446 (2d Cir. 1965) ; Judge Medina
in Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 1957) pointed out that the
courts have stressed:
One or more of a number of factors, including the debt-equity ratio, the presence
of an agreement to maintain proportionality between the advances in question and
acknowledged risk capital, the presence of tax avoidance motives, the use to which
the funds were put, whether outside investors would make such advances, and
lack of reasonable expectation of repayment.
In his opinion the most important factor seemed to be the probability of repayment,
for "Congress evidently meant the significant factor to be whether the funds were
advanced with reasonable expectations of repayment regardless of the success of the
venture .... ." Id. at 406. See also ALl, INcoMz TAX PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 400-37 (1958).
83. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 447-58 (1964); United
States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 172-74 (1964) ; United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 277-81 (1964) United States v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 659-62 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-70 (1963) ; Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
329, 331-32, 334, 344 (1962) ; United States v. du Pont, 353 U.S. 586, 599-95 (1957) ;
Consol. Foods Corp. v. FTC, 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 912
(1964); see also REPORT OF THs ATTORNEY GENERAL's NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO
STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 122-23 (1955).
84. WORZ v. FCC, 323 F.2d 618 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 914
(1964) ; Community Telecasting Corp. v. FCC, 317 F.2d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ; Tampa
Times Co. v. FCC, 230 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v.
FCC, 189 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 342 U.S. 830 (1951). In District of
Columbia v. G.M., 336 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1964) the Court of Appeals applied a
single test, rather than looking to a three-pronged test to determine local franchise
taxes; the Supreme Court, in turn, was quick to grant certiorari and re-
verse, 380 U.S. 553 (1965).
85. Arthur F. Brook, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1730 1737-38 (1964).
86. See Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Verging of Law and Economics,
74 HARv. L. Rzv. 226, 315-17 (1960) ; Hrusoff, Conglomerate Mergers, Joint-Ventures,
Market Extensions and Section 7, 69 DicK. L. R-Xv. 113 (1965); Lewyn & Mann,
Ten Years under the New Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Lawyer's Practical
Approach to the Case Law, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rtv. 1067, 1079-80 (1961); Markham,
Merger Policy under New Section 7: A Six Year Appraisal, 43 VA. L. Rlv. 489, 521-22
(1955) ; Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. Rgv. 176,
182 (1955).
87. Advisory Group on Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
Revised Report on Corporate Distributions and Adjustments 23-24 (1958) [hereafter
cited as Subchapter C Advisory Group Revised Report].
88. ALI, INcoME TAX PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 436 (1958).
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any debt ratio lower than 5 to 1 be acceptable. Their recommendations
have gone for naught.
As a practical matter, the Subchapter S corporation, having so
much to lose, would be well advised to limit its debt ratio to 4 to 1
(80 percent debt) and to borrow from a commercial institution - even
if the stockholders co-sign the corporation's note. Mr. Justice Brennan,
speaking for the Court in Putnam v. Commissioner,"9 a case dealing
with business losses instead of "thin-incorporations," could see "no
real or economic difference between the loss of an investment made in
the form of a direct loan to a corporation and one made indirectly
in the form of a guaranteed bank loan. The tax consequences should
in all reason be the same ... "90 Nevertheless a loan from a commer-
cial lending institution is less likely to be attacked than one from the
shareholders.
The Commissioner has recently attempted to use a § 351 transfer
as a taxable occasion. Taking his cue from a series of cases decided
under § 337,91 which held that bad debt reserves will be taxed as in-
come when the property to which they are attached is sold, he applied
this reasoning to § 351 transfers. The logic is a bit thin as to why bad
debt reserves are not transferred with the accounts they protect. In
practice they are deducted by the purchaser from the value of the
property transferred. Thus, the purchase price has been reduced to
compensate for anticipated uncollectible accounts. Rather than taxing
the reserve as income, the Commissioner should add it to the purchase
price and tax it as a capital gain. When this concept is applied to a
§ 351 exchange, it is no longer merely of questionable merit; it is
absurd. The property has not been sold; all that has changed is the
form under which the enterprise is operated. Why then should the
reserve protecting an operating asset be destroyed? Nevertheless, the
Tax Court in Estate of Heinz Schmidt,9 2 recently held that a proprie-
torship's bad debt reserve became income at the moment the firm in-
corporated. It is doubtful if this decision will stand up on appeal. But
if it does, one more hurdle will be added to effective usage of Sub-
chapter S.
Any corporation desiring to elect may do so by following the
procedure outlined in §§ 1371-72. In addition to the "thin-incorpo-
ration" problem common to corporations and partnerships alike,93 a
89. 352 U.S. 82 (1956).
90. Id. at 92-93; cf. Cudlip v. Commissioner, 220 F.2d 565, 570, 572 (6th Cir. 1955)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) ; see Goldstein, Corporate Indebtedness to Shareholders: "Thin
Capitalization" and Related Problems, 16 TAx L. REv. 1 (1960).
91. Infra p. 38; Arent, Reallocation of Income and Expenses in Connection with
Formation and Liquidation of Corporations, 40 TAXEs 995, 1001-02 (1962).
92. 42 T.C. 1130 (1964).
93. The corporation or partnership that does not increase its debt when electing
will not have the problem that a firm adding debt has. This type of firm will have
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corporation frequently has a second class of stock or certain non-
acceptable assets 4 which must be eliminated before an election may
be made. Obviously the company may sell or distribute the forbidden
fruit as a dividend. Either alternative rewards the tax collector with
a share of the proceeds. In certain situations there may be a third
choice. The corporation may spin-off the forbidden assets to a separate
non-electing corporation prior to electing. The transfer will not be
taxed if the spin-off and distribution of the second corporation's com-
mon stock to the original shareholders meets certain criteria.9" The
shareholders of former corporation X will now have their interest
divided into electing corporation X and non-electing corporation Y
- formerly a part of X. The procedure to be followed is set out in
§ 355.
Section 355 allows the separation of two or more businesses
formerly operated by a single corporation.9" The Code requires that
each of the two businesses must have been in operation for over five
years, and each must continue in operation after separation.97 The
transaction must not be used as a device to distribute earnings and
profits98 or have as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of in-
come tax.99 A rather heavy coating of interpretive gloss has been
spread over certain portions of § 355. The regulations have not merely
amplified the Code; they have restricted its application. The result
has been a great deal of litigation. Controversy has been confined
largely to two areas: the first is the definitional question - what are
two businesses; the second is prompted by the attempt to require a
corporate business purpose behind all splits. Spin-offs by corporations
attempting to qualify for Subchapter S status naturally are affected
by the interpretation of these regulations.
The regulations provide that "Section 355 does not apply to the
division of a single business,"' nor does it apply if either of the two
separate activities do not form a complete business.' 0' A corporation
no trouble showing that its debt was put on in the normal course of business - not
as a tax dodge.
94. § 1372(e) (4) (more than 80 percent of its gross income from sources outside
the United States) ; § 1372(e) (5) (more than 20 percent of its gross receipts from
royalties, rents, dividends, interest, annuities or gain from sales of securities).
95. § 355; S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 50 and H.R. Rep. No. 2543, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 37-38 (1954) describe the purpose behind § 355.
96. § 355(a) (1).
97. §§ 355(b) (2) (A), 355(b) (2) (B) ; Curtis v. United States, 336 F.2d 714
(6th Cir. 1964). However, the new corporation may carry on a different business with
the assets received. Becherv. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Pebble
Springs Distilling Co., 23 T.C. 196, 201 (1954), aft'd, 231 F.2d 288 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 836 (1956).
98. § 355(a) (1) (B).
99. § 355(a) (1) (D) (ii).
100. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1(a) (1956).
101. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.355-1 (c), 1.355-1(d) (examples 8, 10-16) (1956).
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owning securities, land, °2 or a building (even if partially rented out)
may not classify this ownership as a separate business. 10 3 The Code
gives no indication that Congress intended restrictions of this nature
to be imposed. It only requires the distributing corporation and the
corporation to be "engaged immediately after the distribution in the
active conduct of a trade or business. '"104 Although it probably is too
early to tell, it appears that only half of the Treasury's regulations
will stick.
The Tax Court in Edmund P. Coady,'0 5 affirmed on appeal by
the Sixth Circuit,0 6 and the Fifth Circuit in Marett v. United States"°7
invalidated that portion of the regulation'08 reading: "Section 355
does not apply to the division of a single business." These courts
found this provision unduly restrictive and lacking support in the
statute or the legislative history. The Commissioner not only refused
to acquiesce in Coady'09 but continued to press his view. In Patricia
W. Burke,"' the taxpayer first opened a branch store, then spun it
off to a separate corporation. The denial of § 355 status was reversed
by the Tax Court."' At this point the Commissioner capitulated." 2
It is only one step from Coady to the holding that a company
may split itself vertically as well as horizontally. If a company with
two clothing stores may split them into two separate corporations,
what prevents a dairy operating an ice-cream parlor from separating
its activities? Logically, nothing. While no cases seem to be directly
on point, two recent Tax Court decisions indicate that that body would
rule against the Commissioner if the issue were squarely presented.
A state and national bank merged in Mary A. Morris Trust."' Prior
to the merger the state bank carried on an insurance business which it
was required to end. The Commissioner refused to sanction a tax-
free § 355 spin-off because this was not a separate business, but an
integral part of the state bank's operation. The Tax Court merely
ruled that this was in fact a separate business; by doing so it did
102. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.355-1(c)(1), 1.355-1 (d) (example 1) (1956).
103. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.355-1 (c)(2), 1.355-1 (d) (examples 2-4) (1956).
104. § 355(b) (1) (B).
105. 33 T.C. 771 (1960).
106. 289 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1961).
107. 325 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1963).
108. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1(a) (1956).
109. Rev. Rul. 61-198, 1961-2 CuM. BULL. 61.
110. 42 T.C. 1021 (1964).
111. In doing so the Court stated "The statute does not require that the distributing
corporation be engaged in more than one trade or business prior to distribution."
Cf. Bonsall v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 61, 64-65 (2d Cir. 1963).
112. Rev. Rul. 64-147, 1964-1 CuM. BULL. 136; See Jacobs, Spin-offs: The Pre-
Distribution Two Business Rule - Edmund P. Coady and Beyond, 19 TAX L. Rzv.
155, 167 (1964) ; Jacobs, IRS Now Concedes that a Single Business May be Divided
under Section 355, 21 J. TAXATION 22 (1964).
113. 42 T.C. 779 (1964).
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not need to reach the question whether a vertical separation will
qualify for § 355 treatment. Marne S. Wilson"4 is a similar case.
The taxpayer's principal line of business was a furniture store; as a
sideline he conducted his own credit financing. As his business grew,
the credit operation became more and more demanding, until it be-
came expedient to place the credit operation in a separate corporation.
A § 355 transfer was used. The Tax Court again ruled against the
Commissioner declaring this transfer to be a correct application of
§ 355. In neither instance could the adjunct operation stand alone.
In both cases the major and minor activity was conducted on the
same premises largely by the same personnel. In both, the principal
business provided the majority of the minor operation's customers.
The Mary Morris Trust and Wilson decisions certainly water down,
if not fly in the face of, the requirement that a
. . . business consists . . . of activities being carried on for the
pupose of earning income or profit from only such group of
activities, and the activities included in such group must include
every operation which forms a part of, or a step in, the process
of earning profit from such group." 5
The Tax Court may intend to find "separate businesses" - even
where others have difficulty separating them - rather than directly
attacking the regulations.
The third group of restrictions has been maintained. The Service
has been singularly successful in preventing companies owning land,
securities, or buildings. 6 from obtaining the benefits of § 355 when
they spin-off this type of property. The first time the Tax Court con-
sidered these provisions it concluded:
a mere passive receipt of income from the use of property
which is used in the principal trade or business and which is only
incidental to, or an incidental use of a part of property used
primarily in, the principal business would constitute the active
conduct of a trade or business within the meaning of section
355(b), . ..117
It applied this doctrine two years later in Theodore F. Appleby,"'
a case where the business spun-off a building it had partially occupied
and partially rented out. The Tax Court found that the rental activi-
ties did not constitute a separate business but were only incidental to
114. 42 T.C. 914 (1964).
115. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1(c) (1956).
116. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1(c)(1)-(2) (1956).
117. Isabel A. Elliott, 32 T.C. 283, 290 (1959).
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the taxpayer's principal business. It might be noted, by way of pass-
ing, that the Tax Court is applying an extremely strict standard.
In Appleby 50 percent of the floor space and 30 percent of the rental
value of the building was leased." 9 The Second Circuit attempted
to supply the rationale for blocking realty distributions while at the
same time allowing single business split-ups or vertical spin-offs. It
is reported in Bonsall v. Commissioner120 that
[t]he possibility of the shareholders abstracting accumulated earn-
ings at capital gains rates is present whenever a corporation owns
its own factory or office building. Under taxpayer's interpreta-
tion, all that need be done is to transfer the building to a new
corporation and distribute the stock received in return. The
shareholders would then be free to sell their stock and pay a
capital gains rate on the proceeds while the corporation can rent
or purchase another building and reduce its accumulated earn-
ings.
121
Any corporation considering an election will be guided of neces-
sity by these holdings. It seems the company could spin-off foreign
operations 12 2 or could transfer a group of stores to non-consenting
shareholders. Either transaction would qualify under the "single
business" exception as interpreted by Coady. However, Bonsall pre-
vents a firm from ridding itself of sufficient securities or real estate
to reduce its income from this source below 20 percent of total in-
come.' 23 A firm with holding-company income is effectively prevented
from electing unless its shareholders stand ready to bear an immediate
tax on the distribution of the holding company assets. As a practical
matter the company should dispose of all holding company assets
before it elects to be taxed under Subchapter S. If any holding com-
pany property is kept, the possibility always exists that the corpora-
tion will experience a loss year while receiving holding company in-
come. Should this happen the election will be terminated and the
loss may be foregone.
24
It is unfortunate that the Treasury proposed and Congress enacted
the holding company exception as part of the Small Business Act.
119. Id. at 763.
120. 317 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1963).
121. Id. at 65.
122. § 1372(e) (4) ; as the corporation may receive as much as 80 percent of its
income from sources outside the United States this exception is of little value.
123. § 1372 (e) (5).
124. This in fact occurred in Temple N. Joyce, 42 T.C. 628 (1964). In 1959 the
Farmingdale Corporation, a Subchapter S corporation, reported an operating loss
of $211,270 and a gain of $1,947 from the sale of certain securities it held. 'Since
the gain on the sale of the 1,000 shares . .. constituted personal holding company
income and amounted to more than 20 percent of the total gross receipts of Farming-
dale, the . . . election . . . was terminated .... Id. at 637-38. This slip-up cost the
taxpayer approximately $46,000; see also J. William Frentz, 44 T.C. No. 43 (1965).
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By doing so Congress is working at cross-purposes with itself. On
one hand it struggles to prevent individuals from insulating their in-
come through the corporate form. On the other hand it prevents a
corporation having this type of income from electing to be taxed as
an individual. Including holding companies under Subchapter S would
benefit the Treasury. It would collect the individual rates it has been
striving for years to obtain, while the taxpayer at the same time could
obtain a degree of limited liability, From time to time commentators
have discussed this conflict of purpose,125 but Congress to date has
paid them no heed.
Gregory v. Helvering".6 laid down the general principle that
every transaction must not only comply strictly with the provisions
of the Code but must also have a "business purpose." This require-
ment was written into section 1.355-2(c) of the regulations:
The distribution by a corporation of stock or securities of a con-
trolled corporation to its shareholders ...will not qualify under
section 355 where carried out for purposes not germane to the
business of the corporations.
Taxpayers have attacked this section from various directions. It has
been urged that "business purpose" includes the shareholders' busi-
ness. This would be to say that any purpose not having as it princi-
pal goal the avoidance of federal income tax would be acceptable.1
2 7
The older cases, typified by Adams v. Commissioner2 ' and Bazley v.
Commissioner,29 rejected this view and limited "business purpose"
to corporate business. Recent cases, or perhaps merely the First,'
Second"8' and Eighth Circuits" 2 as contrasted with the Tax Court...
125. Borsook, Few Personal Holding Companies Will Qualify for Subchapter S
Election, 10 J. TAXATION 19 (1959).
126. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
127. This test is imposed by various sections of the Code. See §§ 302(c) (2) (B),
306(b) (4), 355(a) (1) (D) (ii), 357(b). See also SUBCHAPTER C ADVISORY GROUP
REvIsED REPORT:
It is further provided in section 355(a) (1) (B) (ii) of the proposed revision that
even though the transaction does not otherwise qualify under section 355 because
of failure to satisfy the active business requirements or the 20 percent distribu-
tion requirement, it will nevertheless qualify under 355 if it is established to the
satisfaction of the Secretary . . .that the distribution is not in pursuance of a
plan having as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income
tax. Id. at 65.
128. 155 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1946), aff'd without discussion of this point, sub. nora.
Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947).
129. 331 U.S. 737 (1947).
130. Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646, 649-50 (lst Cir. 1949).
131. Estate of Parshelsky v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 14, 17-21 (2d Cir. 1962).
132. Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947) ;cf. Easson v, Com-
missioner, 294 F.2d 653, 658-60 (9th Cir. 1961), reversing on other grounds, 33 T.C.
963, 971-73 (1960), non-acq. 1965 INT. REV. BULL. No. 1 at 11.
133. Parshelsky's Estate, 34 T.C. 946 (1960) ; Alice H. Bazley, 4 T.C. 897, 903-04
(1945) ; cf. Rena B. Farr, 24 T.C. 350, 367-69 (1955) ; Estate of John B. Lewis, 10
T.C. 1080, 1086, 1088 (1948) ; Richard H. Survaunt, 5 T.C. 665, 672 (1945).
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and the Third,"4 Fourth,'3 5 and Seventh Circuits,3  have not limited
"business purpose" to the corporation's business. Chief Judge Lum-
bard, speaking for a unanamous panel in Parshelsky's Estate v. Com-
missioner,'3 ' the most recent decision, is of the opinion that most of
the more recent cases have rejected the corporate business limitation
"in favor of an evaluation of all the non-tax-avoidance motives of
both the corporations and shareholders involved."'38 If we may refer
back for a moment to the discussion of "thin-incorporations," it will
be remembered that the courts have abondoned a debt-ratio test and
now look to all pertinent factors. Therefore, the Second Circuit by
substituting a flexible for an inflexible standard is applying the more
modern approach. This view will probably prevail. Perhaps more
importantly, there is a line of cases where the courts have refused to
deny tax-free status to a reorganization when each corporation re-
mained in existence and conducted a bona fide business even though
it was difficult to find a business purpose at the time the split-up
occurred. 9
If the liberal standard is the correct one, a spin-off which paves
the way for an election should itself provide an ample business pur-
pose. The courts probably would accept this justification. In the
past they have been quick to side with the stockholders if they are
not merely attempting to distribute the corporation's earnings under
the guise of a reorganization. 40  The underlying philosophy was ex-
pressed by the Tax Court in Louis Willhouse, Jr.'41 ". . . [T]o pay the
shareholders' personal obligations is not one of the transactions con-
templated as the purpose of corporate reorganization.' '1 42 However the
partition of real estate into separate parcels so each could be willed
to a different legatee was found acceptable in one case. 4" The incidental
watering down of the common to enable a prospective manager to
134. Bazley v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1946), aff'd without discussion
of this point, 331 U.S. 737 (1947).
135. Bondy v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1959).
136. Heady v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1947).
137. 303 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1962).
138. Id. at 18; see also Michaelson, "Business Purpose" and Tax-Frce Reorganiza-
tions, 61 YALx L.J. 14, 31-33 (1952) ; Spear, "Corporate Business Purpose" in
Reorganization, 3 TAx L. Rgv. 225, 242-43 (1948).
139. Lea v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1938) ; Braicks v. Henricksen, 43
F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Wash. 1942), aff'd, 137 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1943); Bremer v.
White, 10 F. Supp. 9 (D. Mass. 1935) ; cf. Lyon, Inc. v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 210
(6th Cir. 1942).
140. See Roemele, Business Purpose and the Subchapter S Inspired Reorpaniza-
tion, 58 MIcH. L. Rtv. 531, 539 (1960) ; Tarleau, Corporate Recapitalizations as
Affected by the Adams and Bazley Cases, 6 N.Y.U. 6rH INST. ON FD. TAx 266 (1948).
141. 3 T.C. 363 (1944).
142. Id. at 368; Ortmayer v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1959) ; Heady
v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1947).
143. Estate of Parshelsky v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1962).
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SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATION.
buy in was favorably received in another.' And decreasing the
size of decedent's estate, making gifts to children, perpetuation of
family holdings or adding flexibility to the management of the prop-
erty have at times been considered business purposes.145
But even if the more strict rule is applied, a corporation's attempt
to qualify for an election should be considered a "business purpose."
The courts have found a corporate purpose when incompatible busi-
nesses were separated, 46 a risky operation was isolated from the rest
of the business, 4 ' or an ultra vires activity was spun-off.' 48 However,
many of these same courts have indicated a "business purpose" may
not be required if each unit remains in operation after separation.'4 9
Judge Learned Hand, for example, said of Gregory v. Helvering "[h] ad
they really meant to conduct a business by means of the two reorganized
companies, they would have escaped whatever other aim they might
have had, whether to avoid taxes, or to regenerate the world.'
x5
Finally, tax avoidance at the corporate level may be classified as hav-
ing a "business purpose." In Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner,'5 '
Judge Waterman commented that "we do not think . . . tax mini-
mization is an improper object of corporate management. .. ."
A split-off solely to allow the corporation to elect to be taxed
under Subchapter S probably will not be blocked as lacking a busi-
ness purpose. No earnings and profits are distributed and, in the
majority of cases, no other taxable event is circumvented.
The corporation with more than one class of stock has a problem
similar to the firm with holding company assets. It must somehow
rid itself of the second class of stock; as long as it is outstanding, the
corporation is ineligible to make an election. If the second class is
preferred and is held by the owners of the common proportionally to
their common interest, it may simply be cancelled, or converted into
common.15 2  Neither alternative will occasion a tax. Only if the
corporation redeems the preferred for cash will a tax be imposed. And
the preferred's basis limits the tax. Preferred originally issued as a
tax-free dividend' will be treated as a dividend to the extent that
144. Rena B. Farr, 24 T.C. 350 (1955).
145. Cf. F. W. Drybrough, 42 T.C. 1029 (1964); Jack L. Easson, 33 T.C. 963
(1960), rev'd, 294 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1961).
146. Riddlesbarger v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1952).
147. Chester E. Spangler, 18 T.C. 976, 984 (1952) ; cf. Giles E. Bullock, 26 T.C.
276, 281-82, 292 (1956), aff'd, 253 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1958).
148. Thomas Williams, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 186 (1953).
149. Supra, note 139.
150. Chrisholm v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S.
641 (1935) ; cf. Becher v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955) (new corporation
carried on a different business with assets received).
151. 232 F.2d 118, 128 (2d Cir. 1956).
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the corporation now has earnings and profits.5 4 One exception exists:
if the redemption terminates the shareholder's interest in the corpo-
ration (due to a previous sale of the common) it will not be treated
as a dividend. 55 Instead it will be treated as part and parcel of the
common. If the preferred was not issued as a common dividend, the
tax will be limited to the difference between the basis and redemption.
B. The Operation
In a sense, the corporation is born anew when it files an election.
Previous losses or accumulated earnings and profits will not affect
nor be affected by, operations under Subchapter S."6 Cutting off
accumulated pre-election earnings should not alter the determination
to elect: However, the corporation with large operating losses is
effectively blocked from electing if it has any short term profit poten-
tial. Even though the pre-election corporation has been divorced from
the current entity, the Code still requires that the electing corporation's
earnings and profits be determined. 57 Shareholder income, in turn,
is governed by the corporation's earnings.
5 8
(1) Earnings and Profits
A Subchapter S corporation computes earnings and profits in
the same manner as other corporations except that the special deduc-
tion allowed partially tax-exempt interest'59 is disallowed. Dividends
from inter-corporate transfers,' 60 foreign corporations,' and certain
types of preferred stock'6 2 are also disallowed.'63 Tax-exempt income
paid to a Subchapter S corporation loses its identity and is taxed to
the shareholder as regular income. State taxes can also affect the
earnings and profits. For example, the corporation allowed to deduct
federal taxes from state corporate income taxes will lose this privilege
when it elects.' 4
154. § 306(a) (2)
155. § 306(b) (1 (A) (iii).
156. Section 1373 d)(1) disallows the loss carryback and carryovers provided by
§ 172(b). See Cowen, Many Potential Problems Are Inherent in Subchapter S
Election, 17 J. TAXATION 86, 89 (1962) ; Note, Optional Taxation of Closely Held
Corporations under the Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 72 HARV. L. REv. 710,715 (1959).157. § 1373(c) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1(b) (1) (1960).
158. § 316(a) (2).
159. § 242; cf. § 702(a) (7).
160. § 243.
161. § 245.
162. §§ 244, 247.
163. § 1373(d) (2).
164. See Kalupa, supra note 44, at 138; Stine, Subchapter S Election May Incrcasc
State Income Tax on Corporation or Stockholders, 10 J. TAXATION 91 (1959).
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On the last day of the electing corporation's year, the earnings
and profits are computed and taxed as if they had been distributed.' 5
It makes no difference, tax-wise, if all, half, or none of the earnings
have been distributed. The person who is a shareholder on the last
day is required to include in his gross income his share of the cor-
poration's annual earnings.' 6 Stock transferred in the waning days
of the corporate year will be taxed to the transferree - even though
he only holds title for one day - not the transferor. 1 7 This provision
allows the transferor to receive the dividends while the transferee pays
the tax. Thus, a certain amount of income splitting can be accomplished
through a well-planned "giving" program. The principal owner of
a Subchapter S corporation may give his "low-bracket" children a
block of stock in December on which he received dividends in May.
He received "high-bracket" income at "low-bracket" rates. For this
reason, the Service is careful in insuring that the gift was bona fide.
The regulations warn that the circumstances surrounding a transfer
between members of a family will be closely scrutinized, 6 ' and if
it is found that they do not reflect the value of services rendered to
the corporation, or no gift was actually made,6 9 the Commissioner
may reallocate distributions among family members.'
The novel feature of being taxed as a Subchapter S corporation
is that today's earnings may be retained and then taken out tax-free
in subsequent years, although one restriction has been imposed. Only
those persons who were shareholders when the retained earnings were
earned may subsequently draw them out on a tax-free basis. A stock-
holder may not sell his shares and then draw out the funds; he must
retain at least one share.17 ' Nor may he transfer undistributed divi-
dends. They are personal to him and may not be drawn upon by
another.'1 2 Moreover, if he sells all his shares and then repurchases
one share, he loses, then regains the right to receive tax-free distribu-
tions.Y13 This requirement is not unreasonable. Any other provision
165. § 1373(b).
166. Ibid.; however he cannot claim the dividend exclusion allowed by §§ 34, 37, or
116 except to the extent the corporation is distributing pre-election earnings. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1375-2(a) (1964).
167. Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-I (a) (2) (1960).
168. Ibid.
169. See Henry D. Durarte, 44 T.C. - No. 21 (1965). Elaborate standards have
been imposed under the partnership provisions to insure bona fide gifts. It can be
assumed these standards apply to Subchapter S corporations. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (e)
(1964). The safest way to avoid the problem is to give the gift in the form of an
irrevocable trust. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (vii) (1964).
170. § 1375(c). See Plowden-Wardlaw, supra note 23, at 991.
171. Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(e) (1960).
172. Ibid.; even decedents' estates may not take out undistributed profits tax-free.
173. Ibid. See Mickey & Wallick, Tax-Saving Plans under Subchapter S Now
More Reliable as Result of New Regulations, 10 J. TAXATION 268, 269-70 (1959).
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would allow earnings to be accumulated by "low-bracket" taxpayers,
then sold to and drawn out, tax-free, by "high-bracket" individuals.
The basis is affected by retained earnings. Both cash distributions
and distributions of property will reduce the basis, 74 although the
latter only affects earnings and profits to the extent that they have not
been allocated to actual money distributions. The regulations have
provided a three-tier distribution plan controlling basis:
(1) Earnings and profits of the taxable year are first allo-
cated to the actual distributions of money ...
(2) The excess . . . is allocated ratably to the constructive
distribution of undistributed taxable income and actual
distributions of property ... and
(3) The remainder... is available to be allocated to distribu-
tions in exchange for stock of the corporation such as
distributions under sections 302 or 331.1"
Therefore, the corporation that annually distributes all earnings will
not subject its shareholders to an income tax on property distribu-
tions. Finally, while a purchaser cannot draw out undistributed earn-
ings, the seller's basis is passed on to him.
(2) Operating Losses
Operating losses are passed directly on to the shareholders where
they may be deducted from the current year's personal income.176 A
corporation that is being liquidated may still elect and pass its operat-
ing losses on to its shareholders.' 7 If the loss exceeds the share-
holder's current taxable income, it may, in the same manner as any
other loss, be carried backward or forward.178 Its only limit is the
adjusted basis of the shareholder's stock plus the adjusted basis of
any indebtedness the corporation may have to him. 179  However,
174. § 1376.
175. Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1(e) (1)-(3) (1960) ; see Sherfy, Partnerships and
Subchapter S: Basis of Property Upon Distribution, N.Y.U. 21ST INST. oN FEo. TAX
1029, 1035 (1962).
176. § 1374(a) ; Hulsey v. Campbell, 64-1 U.S.T.C. q 91,272 (1963) ; du Pont v.
United States, 234 F. Supp. 681, 684 (D. Del. 1964) limits the applicability of Sub-
chapter S losses to corporations that carry on a trade or business. It cannot be used
to pass hobby losses on to the shareholders.
177. Hauptman v. Director of Internal Revenue, 309 F 2d 62 65 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 909 (1963). Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.132-1 (a) (2), 24 Fed.
Reg. 1795-96 (1959) provided in part:
a corporation is not eligible to make an election under sec. 1372(a) if it is
in the process of complete or partial liquidation, or if it has adopted a plan of
such liquidation . . . in the near future.
However, this provision was never adopted.
178. § 172(b) ; See Treas. Reg. § 1,704-1 (d) examples 2 and 3 for illustrations.
179. §§ 1374(c) (2), 1376(b). This concept was introduced as § 704(d) of the
partnership provisions during the 1954 re-write and seems to be limited to partnerships
and Subchapter S corporations.
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losses are treated somewhat differently from earnings. Both are per-
sonal' 80 and may not be transferred; but losses are incurred on a day-
to-day basis"' while earnings are adjusted at the end of the year. A
shareholder selling loss stock on the 30th of December only trans-
fers one day's losses, while the sale of profit stock on the 30th passes
all earnings for that year. This difference reflects the Treasury's at-
tempt to prevent "high-bracket" taxpayers from capitalizing on the
pass-through provisions of the Act. By taxing losses on a daily basis
there is no advantage to purchasing the stock. If this were not so,
the stock - with its built-in operating loss - could be sold to a "high-
bracket" taxpayer in December, and he, in turn, could resell to a third
party in January. Preventing the passage of accumulated earnings
is no problem. The "high-bracket" man attempts to do everything
possible to avoid taking earnings into his gross income. A purchase
of stock in December could only add to his income, perhaps without
even netting him a dividend.'
8 2
If a loss occurs in a year following one when undistributed profits
occurred, the loss must be deducted from previously taxed undistrib-
uted income. 8 If the election is terminated, undistributed earnings
will only be allowed to be taken out tax-free after all pre-election earn-
ings have been distributed.8 4 In contrast, if the shareholders with-
drew their profits when earned, they could not be locked in and losses
generally could be utilized. The difficulty of getting previously taxed
income out was likened by Moore and Sorlien8 5 to the problem Alice,
of Alice in Wonderland fame, faced in obtaining looking-glass jam:
'You couldn't have it if you did want it,' the Queen said. 'The
rule is, jam to-morrow and jam yesterday - but never jam
to-day.'
'It must come sometimes to jam to-day,' Alice objected.
'No, it can't.' said the Queen. 'It's jam every other day: to-day
isn't any other day, you know."8"
II.
TRANSMITTING THE CORPORATION To THE CHILDREN
The shareholder who does not wish to sell or liquidate his cor-
poration is faced with the problem of minimizing the eventual estate
180. Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(e) (1960).
181. § 1374(c).
182. See Moore & Sorlien, supra note 8, at 468.
183. § 1375(d) (2) (B).
184. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1375-4(a)-(b) (1960).
185. Supra note 8, n.33, at 468.
186. CARROLL, ALICE's ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THe LOOKINC.-
GLASS 225 (World Pub. Co. 1946 ed.).
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tax 87 imposed on his shares. Several alternatives are available. To
a limited degree they may also be used by a Subchapter S corporation.
A. The Redemption
The corporate shareholder may anticipate heavy estate taxes
and either accumulate funds during his lifetime or purchase life in-
surance to meet this burden. As an alternative the corporation itself
may accumulate a reserve large enough to pay estate taxes 18 owing
by its principal owners. This, in fact, may be the only solution if
the shareholders are saddled with a provision completely or partially
restraining the transferability of their stock." 9 Assuming the com-
pany has been incorporated in a jurisdiction which permits corpora-
tions to purchase their own shares, °90 certain restrictive conditions
must still be met. The local corporation law will probably require
that purchases be made from earned surplus.' If the security behind
outstanding debentures is impaired, if contract rights of preferred
shareholders are impinged, or if the firm itself is drained of operat-
ing capital, the purchase becomes infeasible, if not illegal. However,
the corporation may have taken out an insurance policy on the life
of the decedent and now have sufficient funds to acquire his shares." 2
If the firm has available funds and certain conditions are met, a por-
tion of the shares formerly held by the decedent may be redeemed by
187. The executor must include the fair market value of the decedent's shares on
the date of his death in the estate. No credit or deduction is given for constructive
dividends retained in the business, although they have increased the basis of the
stock which will prove of value if the stock is liquidated § 1376(a). See Peden,
Problems Resulting from the Death of the Principal Partner or Principal Share-
holder, N.Y.U. 21ST INST. ON FED. TAX 1051, 1061-62 (1962).
188. This presupposes that these funds are such that they are not deemed to be an
excessive accumulation of earnings under § 532(a). This section imposes a tax upon
"every corporation . . . formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income
tax with respect to its shareholders . . . by permitting earnings and profits to
accumulate instead of being divided or distributed." It would seem that this provision
requires a showing by the Commissioner that the company not only accumulated funds
far beyond what were needed to operate the business but did so as a tax avoidance
device. Young Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1960) (the tax
should only be imposed when the dominant or primary purpose of accumulating funds
was the avoidance of tax on the company's shareholders) ; Henry Van Hummell,
Inc., 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1765 (1964); see Herwitz, Stock Redemptions and the
Accumulated Earnings Tax, 74 HARV. L. Rxv. 866, 874-78 (1961).
189. O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations:
Planning and Drafting, 65 HARV. L. Rev. 773, 776-77 (1952), believes such provisions
are commonly encountered in the charters of small closely held corporations. By way
of illustration he lists seven distinct types of restrictions commonly imposed on the
transferability of common stock.
190. Id. at 795.
191. For a good discussion of this problem see BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 256-72
(rev. ed. 1946).
192. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING, 978-79, 984 (3d ed. 1961), suggests this alterna-
tive; see also Logan, Estate Planning for the Small Businessman, 8 KAN. L. REv. 590,
603 (1960).
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the corporation. The proceeds, if taxed at all, will be subject to capital
gain rather than ordinary income rates.
193
To have a partial redemption of a former shareholder's interest
under § 303, a series of fairly restrictive conditions must be met. The
securities about to be redeemed must be included in the gross estate'
and may not exceed the amount of "the estate, inheritance, legacy, and
succession taxes . . . imposed because of such decedent's death,' 9'
and the . . . funeral and administration expenses .. "196 A further
requirement is imposed on the stock: it must comprise 35 percent or
more of the value of the decedent's estate. 9 7 To successfully apply
this provision, the redeeming company must have available liquid
funds,' or be in a position to borrow redemption cash; the estate
must hold .the firm's stock as its principal asset and owe sizeable death
taxes.
When the heirs are the corporation's sole shareholders, or the re-
maining owners are agreeable, the corporation may completely re-
deem all, or a substantial part, of the decedent's stock - again at
capital gains rates. Section 302 will permit such a redemption if: (a)
the stock remaining in the hands of the redeemers (heirs) represents
less than 50 percent of the outstanding voting power, 99 and (b)
the redemption qualifies under the ratio of the voting stock owned
by the redeemers after the redemption by being less than 80 percent
of the ratio of the redeemer's stock to all the voting stock before the
redemption.200 Termination of the redeeming party's entire interest
also qualifies the redemption.20 ' As a practical matter, when three of
the four equal heirs wish to terminate their interest, they may do
so without any difficulty. 02 It is only when they all wish to reduce
193. § 303(a) "A distribution of property to a shareholder by a corporation in
redemption of part or all of the stock of such corporation . . . shall be treated as a
distribution in full payment in exchange for the stock so redeemed."
194. Ibid.
195. § 303(a) (1). This is not to say that the funds actually must be used for
these purposes. The enumerated purposes only serve to limit the amount that may
be taken out of the corporation under this provision.
196. § 303(a) (2).
197. § 303(b) (2) (A) (i). Actually the Code provides for two alternative situations
to the 35 percent rule. If 50 percent of the taxable estate is composed of a single
corporation's stock or if 75 percent of the estate is tied up in the stock .'f two or more
corporations this stock may be redeemed, § 303(b) (2) (B). See Bittker, op. cit. supra
note 68, at 236-38, where he points out, that Treas. Reg. § 1.303-2(d) (1955), allows
even § 306 stock" to be redeemed.
198. § 6166(a) eases this burden by permitting an estate meeting the requirements
of § 303(b) (2) (B) to pay the federal estate tax in not more than 10 equal installments
spread over a 10 year period.
199. § 302(b) (2) (B).
200. § 302(b) (2) (C).
201. § 302(b) (3).
202. As § 302(c) incorporates § 3!8(a) [78 Stat. 762 (1964)] care must be taken
to be certain that the stock held by the remaining heirs, (through constructive owner-
ship) is not sufficient to destroy the redemption.
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their holdings that complications arise. When the heirs, or the estate
wish to take as much cash as possible out of the corporation without
completely stepping out, § 303 should be applied before a § 302 re-
demption is attempted. As § 303 is the more restrictive section, it
may be used without hampering a § 302 redemption. However if the
parties first proceed under § 302 they will lose the benefit of § 303.113
Factors other than tax considerations often block a redemption in
the last analysis. A redemption would permanently stunt the enter-
prise's growth if it is young, growing, and constantly in need of funds.
Such a procedure would be out of the question if the remaining share-
holders are not amiable to a redemption of the decedent's interest." 4
Subchapter S stock that has not been willed to a trust2 5 and meets
a few additional qualifications can be redeemed. The firm may still
operate in the Subchapter S form after redemption. The election will
not be destroyed if a portion of the outstanding shares is held as
treasury stock,2 ' nor will it terminate if an estate is one of its share-
holders.20 7 However the executor must be careful to file a written
"consent" within 30 days after he has qualified under local law, 0 s
or the corporation will automatically lose its elected status.0 9 Dis-
tribution of stock to more than ten heirs also terminates the election.
The corporation has three sources of funds, which it may use to
redeem a decedent shareholder's stock: it may use retained pre-election
earnings and profits; or post-election retained earnings; or it may
elect to sell a portion of its operating assets. In each instance the dis-
tribution will not be taxed as ordinary income. The effect on the
corporation's earnings and profits or the adjusted basis of the re-
maining shares may vary depending upon the source of the funds.
Bittker indicates that the entire question is cloaked with considerable
doubt.210 Section 312(e) provides that the part of the "distribution
which is properly chargeable to capital account shall not be treated
as a distribution of earnings and profits." After a charge is made
203. See Gelband, Tax Trap Hidden in Sec. 303; Careful Timing of Other Redemp-
tions Necessary, 8 J. TAXATION 244 (1958).
204. Peden, supra note 187, at 1060, suggests three ways to mitigate these problems:
(1) an agreement among the shareholders to bind their successors to consent to the
election; (2) an agreement forbidding transfer to non-consenting shareholders; (3) a
statement of the problem in the by-laws. Nine methods are listed by Moore & Sorlien,
supra note 8, at 485-86.
205. Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1960) ; 1 Old Virginia Co., 44 T.C. No. 69 (1965).
206. § 1371 (a) (2) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1 (a) (2) (1960).
207. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-3(b) (1960).
208. While Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-3(a) (1964) allows the district director to grant
an extension if certain conditions are met the taxpayer has no right to one; thus
he may find it difficult to convince the district director that an extension is warranted.
209. § 1372-(e) (3). The heir must also be careful to file a "consent" to the Sub-
chapter S election within 30 days after receipt of the stock. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-3(b)
(1960).
210. Bittker, op. cit. supra, note 68, at 244-45.
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to capital, 21 1 the balance should go to reduce pre-election earnings.
This reduction should allow a portion of future distributions to be
taxed as dividends rather than as a return of capital. 212 A different
result may be expected if the corporation has retained a portion of
its post-election, but none of its pre-election, earnings. Section 1.1373-
1 (e) of the regulations 218 states that earnings should first be allocated
to dividends, then to property other than money, and finally "the re-
mainder . . . is available to be allocated to distributions in exchange
for stock of the corporation such as distributions under section 302
or 331. ' 1214 But even if this provision reduces the earnings and profits
account, the remaining shareholders do not stand to benefit from the
reduction. The retained post-election earnings are "personal and can-
not in any manner be transferred to another. '215 Earnings in excess
of distributions will only increase shareholders' basis216 rather than
supplementing the pre-election earnings and profits account.2 1 Con-
versely, redemptions or partial liquidations occurring after a Sub-
chapter S corporation has been terminated will not be improved by
prior redemptions.21 s A sale of property by the corporation with the
proceeds used to redeem a portion of the outstanding stock will be
taxed as capital gain to each shareholder to the extent the sale price
exceeds the basis of the asset and is not in excess of the corporation's
taxable income. 1 ' The remaining shares will suffer neither gain nor
loss due to this transaction. Once it is anticipated that substantial
sums have to be taken out of the business to pay estate taxes the cor-
poration is well advised to pay out all post-election earnings as divi-
dends. The redemption would then come out of pre-election earnings
and profits or new debt incurred for this purpose.
B. Reducing the Tax Liability
The alternative to acquiring sufficient funds to pay the decedent's
estate tax is reduction of the taxable estate. The methodology for
accomplishing this project is effectively limited by the present tax
structure to inter vivos gifts.
Few men object to reducing a tax liability; however, few desire
to give up control of their property merely to reduce the tax burden
211. § 312(a) ; Bittker, op. cit. supra, note 68, at 245.
212. § 316(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.316-1(a) (2) (1955).
213. Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1(e) (1960).
214. Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1 (e) (3).
215. Treas. Reg. § .1.1375-4(e) (1960).
216. § 1376(a).
217. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(a) (1960).
218. Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(a) (1960).
219. § 1375(a). As with earnings the tax applies even if the proceeds are not
distributed. Capital gains are discussed in more detail at pp. 37-38 infra.
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their heirs will be required to face. Family relationships must also
be considered. If a gift of property to children will make them inde-
pendent of their parents, any successful program will need as one of
its features some means of delaying enjoyment until the donees have
attained sufficient maturity to competently deal with their bequests.
When dealing with a donor whose principal asset is securities in a
closely held corporation, a special problem often must be overcome.
The program must be constructed so the donor will not lose control
of his firm. This is especially so if he is employed by the firm and
takes as salary a substantial portion of his return. Thus, any program
to meet with widespread acceptance will have three features: it will
remove property from the holder's estate; it will not substantially im-
pair the current income of either the donor or the company; and it
will not jeopardize the holder's position in his firm. Generally, there
are several possible solutions; however Subchapter S shareholders seem
to be limited to one.
The simplest alternative is the outright inter vivos gift of stock
from father to son.2 So long as the donee receives an immediate
ownership interest, or, in the language of the Code, "receives a present
interest," '' the transaction qualifies for the gift tax exemption. Only
when the gift has strings attached or is a gift of a "future interest,"
will it fail to receive the exemption.2 22 Any donor, who persuades
his wife to file a notice of consent, may make an initial tax-free gift
223
of $60,000224 and may add $6,000 per year per child.221 In practice
once a continuous annual giving plan is initiated, it can be continued
indefinitely without fear of being declared a gift in contemplation of
death and thereby included in the donor's estate for tax purposes.22 6
Depending upon the number of recipients, $200,000 to $300,000 can
be lopped off the donor's estate in a ten or fifteen year period. The
Subchapter S shareholders may use a giving program in the same
manner as the normal corporate shareholder uses his. There is one
difference. That portion of the earnings attributable to the children's
220. As each child will count toward the 10 shareholder limit a widespread giving
program may be impractical. Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(d) (1) (1960).
221. § 2503(b).
222. § 2503(c).
223, This only is an exemption from the federal gift tax; several states have local
provisions which would impose some tax liability upon the donor. For a list of state
gift tax statutes see Logan, supra note 192, at 604.
224. § 2521.
225. §§ 2503(b), 2513 (a) (2).
226. § 2035 includes all gifts made in contemplation of death. Estate of Johnson,
10 T.C. 680, 687-92 (1948), contains an excellent discussion of the various factors
that must be considered in determining whether a gift was made in contemplation of
death. A series of gifts made over a prolonged period is almost conclusive proof that
none of the gifts were in contemplation of death.
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shares will be taxed to them227 even though retained in the business. 22
If the principal shareholder-donor has a marginal tax-rate of 60 or
70 percent, this provision will serve him well, especially if his children
are expected to come into the firm. Conceivably they can come in with
high basis stock and the built-in privilege of withdrawing substantial
sums - accumulated at low rates - tax-free.
Although the Commissioner has ruled a gift of stock to a child
acceptable for income and estate tax purposes,229 this type of gift may
encounter other difficulties. A few states still do not permit minors
to hold securities, most brokerage houses refuse to transfer stock held
in a minor's name, and income paid to the minor that is expended for
his support may end up on the donor's income tax return.23 Generally
these problems can be overcome if some form of a trust, custodian, or
statutory guardian holds the securities.28' Unfortunately the use of a
trust is unavailable to a Subchapter S shareholder. Section 1371 (a) (2)
of the Code and § 1.1371-1(g) of the regulations specifically prohibits
trusts - even voting trusts232 - from holding Subchapter S stock.
While it may be debated whether this provision was warranted ,2
a3
there is no question that it has destroyed one of the estate planner's
basic tools. However a custodianship may be used. The Commissioner
227. § 1373(b).
228. § 1373(b). See also Anthoine, supra note 12, at'1167.
229. Rev. Rul. 54-400, 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 319-20; see generally Caplin, Trusts for
Minors, N.Y.U. 14TH INST. ON FED. TAX 361 (1956) ; Ehrlich, Consideration of Gifts
to Minors is Essential in a Tax-Saving Family Prcgram, 17 J. TAXATION 157 (1962);
Levin, Gifts to Infants: Developments, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX 873,
886 (1957).
230. Visintainer v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 521 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
858 (1951) ; Pflugradt v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 379, 383-84 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd,
310 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1962) ; Lawrence Miller, 2 T.C. 285, 288 (1943) ; Edward H.
Heller, 41 B.T.A. 1020, 1031 (1941), aff'd without discussion of this point, sub norm.
Ehrman v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 609 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668 (1941).
231. Casner, op. cit. supra, note 192, at 243-44; Note, Recent Legislation to
Facilitate Gifts of Securities to Minors, 69 HARV. L. Rrv. 1476 (1956).
232. Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(d) (1) (1960) ; this provision when first issued as
proposed reg. § 1.1371-1(c), 24 Fed. Reg. 1795 (1959), was bitterly opposed by the
tax bar. Clark & Lanahow, Proposed Subchapter S Liquidation Rule Opposed at
Hearing; Other Issues Raised, 11 J. TAXATION 13, 14 (1959). See also Rev. Rul.
63-226, 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 341.
233. In support see Note, Optional Taxation of Closely Held Corporations under
the Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 72 HARV. L. R~v. 710, 711-12 (1959):
The denial of subchapter S treatment to corporations any of whose stock is
owned by a trust may be attributable to two factors. First, it may have been
intended to prevent circumvention of the rules for eligibility, such as the ten
shareholder rule, Second, considerable difficulty would have been created in the
administration of trusts and in their taxation.
However, the Tax Court recently indicated, by way of dicta, that this portion of
the regulations, if put to a direct test, may be invalid. In Catalina Homes, Inc., 23
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1368 (1964), after first pointing out that for purposes of the
instant decision it is not necessary to determine whether a voting class creates a
second class of stock, the following statement is found: "However we do deem it
appropriate to note our reservations as to whether these arguments [made by the
Commissioner] represent a reasonable interpretation of the applicable statutory
provisions." Cf. Commissioner v. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc., 220 F.2d 415, 420, aff'd
without mention of this argument on rehearing, 225 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1955).
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has indicated gifts of stock to minors held by a custodian will be con-
sidered gifts of a "present interest," therefore qualifying for the
annual $3,000 gift tax exclusion.23 4  This provision also applies to
Subchapter S corporations; thus, a donor may give Subchapter S
stock without terminating the election.2 35 When compared to a trust,
a custodianship is a pale second choice. It appears to have all of the
disadvantages without any of the benefits. Section 677(b) is illustra-
tive of the benefit given to a trust settlor that is not accorded to a
guardianship settlor. The pertinent portion of this provision provides:
Income of a trust shall not be considered taxable to the grantor
. *. merely because such income in the discretion of another
person, the trustee, or the grantor acting as trustee or co-trustee,
may be applied or distributed for the support or maintenance of
a beneficiary whom the grantor is legally obligated to support or
maintain, except to the extent that such income is so applied....
If this section is limited to trusts then Helvering v. Stuart,23 6 the
moving force behind the enactment of § 677(b), would be resurrected;
the donor would be taxed on any income that could be spent for
support of the beneficiaries. Almost any expenditure a legal guardian
would be inclined to make, with the possible exception of furnishing
the funds for a college education,28 7 could be deemed to relieve the
donor of his support obligation. The regulations add to the diffi-
culty by making it clear that interfamily transfers of Subchapter S
stock will be closely examined.23 Distributions may be reapportioned
within the family group23 9 if they are found to be disproportionate24
or not reflective of the value of services the owners have rendered the
234. Rev. Rul. 54-400, 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 319-20; a series of recent rulings deal
with the use of custodianships. Rev. Rul. 59-357, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 212, Rev. Rul.
57-366, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 618 (estate tax) ; Rev. Rul. 56-484, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 23
(income tax) ; Rev. Rul. 56-86, 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 449 (gift tax) ; see also Roberts
& Alpert, Subchapter S: Semantic and Procedural Traps in its Use: Analysis of
Dangers, 10 J. TAXATION 2, 3 (1959).
235. Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(d) (1) (1960).
236. 317 U.S. 154 (1942) ; Hopkins v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 683 (6th Cir. 1944);
cf. Estate of Hamiel v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1958) ; see Pedrick,
Grantor Powers and Estate Taxation: The Ties that Bind, 54 Nw. U.L. Rrv.
527 (1959).
237. Several cases have held that parents have an obligation to provide their
children with a college education. While it is true that these decisions arose in divorce
proceedings the handwriting is on the wall. Strom v. Strom, 13 I11. App. 2d 354, 142
N.E.2d 172 (1957) ; Rawley v. Rawley, 94 Cal. App. 2d 562, 210 P.2d 891 (1949) ;
Cohen v. Cohen, 193 Misc. 106, 82 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Sup. Ct. 1948) ; Jackman v. Short,
165 Ore. 626, 109 P.2d 860 (1941) ; Feek v. Feek, 187 Wash. 573, 60 P2d 686 (1936) ;
Refer v. Refer, 102 Mont. 121, 56 P.2d 750 (1936) ; Payette v. Payette, 85 N.H. 297,
157 At. 531 (1931) ; contra, Morris v. Morris, 92 Ind. App. 65, 171 N.E. 386 (1930) ;
Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 58 N.J. Eq. 570, 43 AtI. 904 (1899) ; Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d
1207, 1220-33 (1957) ; See generally Miller Appropriate For:ims of Gifts to Minors,
N.Y.U. 16TH INST. ON FzD. TAX 765, 770 (1958).
238. Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1 (a) (2) (1960); see also Cowen, supra note 156, at 90.
239. Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-3(d) (1960).
240. Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-3(a) (1960).
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corporation. While the Commissioner is busy examining the nature
of the distributions it is not unreasonable to expect that he might also
examine the guardian's disposal of the minor's income. But, even
with all its shortcomings, the custodianship or guardianship must
be used with minor stockholder-donees - nothing else is available.
The practical effect of this limitation will force the donor to insure
that all dividends are constructive (retained by the corporation) or
are accumulated by the guardian until the minor reaches his twenty-
first birthday when they must be distributed to him.24'
Once the hurdles of drafting a successful guardianship are over-
come, several problems still remain. Control of the corporation is
one ;242 in some cases it may be the deciding factor whether a guardian-
ship is to be created at all. If the donor is the sole owner, this prob-
lem generally will not arise. But what happens if he owns 40 percent
of the stock and three adverse parties own the remaining 60 percent?
In this situation the guardian will be required to vote any stock given
him along with the donor. The obvious solution - the parent-donor
acting as guardian - destroys the validity of the gift. Then, in all
probability, these shares not only will be included in the donor's estate,
but the current income will, under the Lucas v. Earl243 doctrine, be
taxed to him as well.
The criteria for guardianships are not well developed, but, at
least in this area, the standards worked out for trusts should be
applicable. To pass both the corpus and the income, care must be
taken in drawing up the guardianship agreement that:
(1) The donor does not have the power to replace the adverse
trustees (guardians) except in accordance with definite pre-
scribed standards ;244
241. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-4(c) (1958); this regulation attempts to modify Com-
missioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442 (1945) and Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18
(1945), holding that corpus pay-outs occurring after the minor's twenty-first birthday
were, under the 1939 Code, gifts of future interests. In Rev. Rul. 60-218, 1960-1 CuM.
BULL. 378, it was ruled that a trust allowing the beneficiary to compel distribution
when he reached twenty-one did not qualify. He must not be required to perform
an overt positive act of either requiring the corpus to be distributed or requiring it
to be accumulated; the trustee must be required to distribute the corpus unless the
beneficiary specifically orders him to do otherwise. See Frazier, Recent Developments
in Trusts for Minors, N.Y.U. 21sT INST. ON FXD. TAx 299, 300-01 (1963). In Com-
missioner v. Herr, 303 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1962), affirming, 35 T.C. 732 (1961), the
grantor provided that all income would be paid out when the beneficiary reached
twenty-one; he would receive the corpus at thirty. The Tax Court held that a trust
may be split into, two parts - income and corpus; only the corpus was deemed to be
a future interest. Thus, the grantor may claim a gift of the present value of the
income right. The Commissioner has not acquiesced in this decision. 1962-2 CuM.
BULL. 6; cf. Walter v. United States, 295 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1961).
242. Roberts & Alpert, supra note 234, at 4.
243. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
244. A donor having unlimited power to remove trustees without cause and replace
them was in Loughridge's Estate v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 294 (10th Cir.), cert.
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(2) Neither the income nor the corpus can revert back to the
donor within ten years ;245
(3) The donor does not have a power of disposition without
consent of an adverse party ;216
(4) No administrative controls are retained by the donor ;247
(5) The trust (guardianship) is not revokable;24
(6) The donor does not have the power without the consent
of an adverse party to distribute income to himself ;240 and
denied, 340 U.S. 830 (1950), considered subject to both income and estate taxation
under Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940). In the words of Caplin, supra note
229, at 372:
Under the 1939 Code . . . through this incident of dominion and control, the
donor was deemed to possess all of the powers initially granted to the trustee;
and, where the actual possession of such powers by the donor would have resulted
in his being taxable, this constructive possession similarly brought taxation.
See Warren H. Corning, 24 T.C. 907 (1955), aff'd, 239 F.2d 646 (6th Cir. 1956)
Louis Stockstrom, 4 T.C. 5 (1944), aff'd, 151 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1945) ; cf. Hormel
v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552 (1941). The result will probably be the same under the
1954 statute. Walter v. United States, 295 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1961), citing with
approval Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953) and Du Charme's Estate v.
Commissioner, 164 F.2d 959 (1947), modified, 169 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1948). However,
when the 1954 Code was enacted all of § X851 of the A.L.I. FtD. INcomF TAX STAT.
(February, 1954 draft), was adopted except § (d) which read: "If the grantor or
a related or subordinated party has the power to remove a trustee without cause,
the grantor shall be treated as possessing the powers of that trustee." This provision
was not included in either the House or Senate Bills when they came out of committee.
S. Rep. No. 1662, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1954). It is interesting to note that the Advisory Group on Subchapter J of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Revised Report on Trusts 42 (1957) recommended
that § 672 be left unchanged.
A substitution required by the incapacity of a trustee should not make the trust
taxable to the donor. Rev. Rul. 55-393, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 448; United States v.
Winchell, 289 F.2d 212, 216-17 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74, 77
(2d Cir. 1947) ; Kohnstamm v. Pedrick, 153 F.2d 506, 509 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Cent. Nat'l
Bank v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 1944) ; Estate of Newcomb Carlton,
34 T.C. 988, 996 (1960), rev'd on other grounds, 298 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1962) ; see
generally Casner, op. cit. supra note 192, at 202-03.
245. § 673(a) and (d). In addition Treas. Reg. § 1.677(a)-l(g) (example 2)
(1956) points out any capital gain realized by the trust will be taxed to the donor if
he retains a reversionary right. For this reason revocable trusts have been disregarded
as an alternative method of dealing with the problem at hand. Cf. Miller, supra
note 237, at 772.
246. § 674(a). The power to shift property from one beneficiary to another, even
if not exercised, will be sufficient to include the trust corpus in the donor's estate.
§§ 2036(a) (2), 2038(a) (1); Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a) (1958); Commissioner v.
Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480, 487 (1946) ; Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436
(1933) ; Commissioner v. Hofheimer's Estate, 149 F.2d 733, 735-36 (2d Cir. 1945)
Pedrick, supra note 236, at 534.
247. § 675(4) ; James L. Darling, 43 T.C. No. 43 (1965) ; cf. Thompson v. United
States, 209 F. Supp. 530, 539-41 (E.D. Tex. 1962) (grantor may retain power to select
individual beneficiaries).
248. § 676(a).
249. § 677(a) (1) and (2) ; Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953). In 1959
the First Circuit in State Street Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635, confused
the area further by ruling that a grantor retaining trustee powers, even in connection
with a corporate fiduciary, has retained sufficient ownership to have the property
included in his estate. This decision was followed by the Tax Court. Estate of
John J. Round, 40 T.C. 970, 978-81 (1963), aff'd, 332 F.2d 590 (lst Cir. 1964) ; cf.
Struthers v. Kelm, 218 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1955) ; Rundle v. Welch, 184 F. Supp. 777
(S.D. Ohio 1960) ; but was rejected by United States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th
Cir. 1962) ; Estate of Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973, 978-81 (1962) (grantor who, in
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(7) The agreement is drawn in accordance with local trust and
tax statutes. 5 °
The donor may overcome all of these difficulties by naming a cor-
porate fiduciary as sole trustee (guardian). However the donor may
require that he retain some power - if only a power of suggestion -
over the voting of this stock. It would seem that a joint donor-cor-
porate-fiduciary guardianship, with the latter having final control,
would be the answer. Again drawing from the trust regulations, the
standard, described in terms of power, would seem to be complied with:
If a power is exercisable by a person as trustee, it is presumed
that the power is exercisable in a fiduciary capacity primarily
in the interests of the beneficiaries. This presumption may be
rebutted only by clear and convincing proof that the power is
not exercisable primarily in the interests of the beneficiaries.2 5'
Without getting into the factual question of what is "primarily in the
interest of the beneficiaries" it would seem that Congress only intended
the donor to act in other than an unbridled fashion. The donor's
serving as joint guardian along with a bank would satisfy the statute;
the minor beneficiary would be protected; and the grantor would be
secure, for he would probably influence the bank to vote in a manner
to preserve his position in the company.252 Unfortunately, the First
Circuit, in a recent decision, seems to have disregarded the spirit,
if not the letter, of this section. In State Street Trust v. United States25
the court held that a grantor, who as co-trustee with a corporate fi-
connection with corporate fiduciary, has power to determine what investments the
trust shall make does not retain sufficient incidents of ownership to pull the corpus
back into his estate). The distinction between State Street and King turns on the
type of power retained. A power to accumulate or distribute income seems to be a
sufficient ownership tie; administrative functions, standing alone, are not. See Tomlin-
son, Advantages and Dangers of Trustee Powers, N.Y.U. 20'rH INST. ON FED. TAX
195-204 (1962).
250. Flitcroft v. Commissioner, 328 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1964) (local statutes deter-
mine whether or not a valid trust has been created). Cf. Morgan v. Commissioner,
309 U.S. 78 (1940) ; Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1961) :
Although it is the Internal Revenue Code rather than' local law which establishes
the tests or standards which will be applied in determining the classification
in which an organization belongs, local law governs in determining whether the
legal relationships which have been established in the formation of an organiza-
tion are such that the standards are met. Thus, it is local law which must be
applied in determining such matters as the legal relationships of the members of
the organization among themselves and with the public at large, and the interest
of the members of the organization in its assets.
See generally Stephens & Freeland, What Law Controls in Federal Tax Controversies:
State or Federal?, 17 J. TAXATION 182 (1962).
251. Treas. Reg. § 1.675-1(b)(4) (1956).
252. Although trust departments of banks generally prefer not to vote shares they
hold, they expend a great deal of effort attempting to attract trusts; thus any bank
would be extremely unhappy to have the reputation that it will refuse to support the
settlor if his position is challenged. See Lowndes, Recent Developments Cast Doubt
on Use of Inter Vivos Trust to Avoid Estate Tax, 19 J. TAXATION 148 (1963).
253. 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959).
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duciary retained the power to participate in the decision whether in-
come would be accumulated or paid out, had retained sufficient in-
cidents of ownership as defined by §§ 2036 and 2038 to require that
the corpus of the trust be included in his taxable estate. It is only
a short step to a similar holding when the donor retains voting powers
- § 675(4) notwithstanding. Whether State Street Trust was or
was not correctly decided remains an open question; in any case the
handwriting is on the wall. Joint guardianships are dangerous. If at
all possible they should be avoided. In the normal corporate situation
this problem may be eliminated by tying the donee's voting power to
a voting trust;254 however this alternative is not available to the
holder of Subchapter S stock.2 15  Nevertheless, one final possibility
remains. Section 1.1371-1(g) of the regulations provides in part:
A corporation having more than one class of stock does not
qualify as a small business corporation. . . .However, if two or
more groups of shares are identical in every respect except that
each group has the right to elect members of the board of di-
rectors in a number proportionate to the number of shares in
each group, they are considered one class of stock.
If this provision means that shareholders may be limited to voting
for a director to represent their particular group, a little judicious
gerrymandering will protect the majority position. Merely by giving
the stock from one or two groups the donees may be limited to one
or two board seats, or if stock is only given from those groups where
the donor has a strong position, the donees can be denied any represen-
tation. Before relying on such a nebulous provision, the practitioner
would be well-advised to seek a favorable revenue ruling.
In the great "give-away" program, the Subchapter S shareholder
is severely hampered when compared with the normal corporate owner.
His flexibility is sorely limited. None of the three most widely used
techniques for passing a corporation on to the second or third genera-
tions are available to him. Normally the principal owners may issue
254. LArTIN, CORPORATIONS 325, n.32 (1959), lists thirty-five states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia as specifically authorizing by statute the use of voting trusts. He
points out, at 325, that the majority of the statutes provide for irrevocable voting trusts
for a period of not over 10 years, many of them with renewal provisions . . .. for
another ten years ...." The leading case in this area is Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey
Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (1947). In support of
the majority position BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 184, at 426 (rev. ed. 1946) states:
The current prevailing view toward voting trusts has come to be that they are
valid even in the absence of statute, except where an improper motive or object
is shown. The reason is that this device is the only sure method of binding share-
holders to vote as a unit and thus assuring a desirable stability and continuity in
management in situations where that is needed.
See also BAKER AND CARY, CORPORATIONS 262-66 (3d ed. 1959) ; 5 FLETcHER, CYC.
CORP. § 2064 (Perm. ed. 1952).
255. Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(d) (1) (1960).
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themselves preferred stock and give the common to their children.
The receipt of the preferred is tax-free256 and the common passes
under the high exemption gift tax provisions. The donor typically
continues to operate the business (taking his return as salary) until
he is ready to retire. At this point the corporation redeems all pre-
ferred. As the redemption terminates his interest in the corporation,
any gain to the donor is only taxed at capital gain rates ;257 any in-
crease in the value of the company during this period is attributable
to the common and is not taxed at this juncture. The same objective
(with control retained by the donor) may be accomplished by rein-
corporating the company into voting and non-voting stock and giving
away the non-voting shares. This can be done in either of two ways.
The shareholders can turn in their old common stock for class A and
class B stock, with A alone having voting rights, or non-voting stock
can be distributed as a dividend. The shareholders receiving these
dividends, will, in turn, pass them on to the donees. Although the
concepts are simple, the mechanics of these transactions pose tremen-
dous difficulties.2 51 In any event these alternatives are foreclosed to
Subchapter S shareholders. Section 1371(a)(4), it will be remem-
bered, limits an electing corporation to one class of stock. The regula-
tions issued to clarify this section do not merely prevent the corpora-
tion from issuing preferred; they provide that "a difference as to voting
rights, dividend rights, or liquidation preferences of outstanding stock
will disqualify a corporation. '' 259  Therefore, the Subchapter S stock-
holder is effectively limited to disposing of his stock through an out-
right gift.
C. Valuing the Stock
Some methods of valuing the stock must be developed.26  The
Commissioner, for obvious reasons, requires a determination to be
made. The donor will need to know how much stock may be passed
256. § 305.
257. § 306(b) (1) (A) (iii).
258. For a detailed discussion of the mechanics of these transactions see Hrusoff,
Minimizing the Estate Tax Bite, 39 TUL. L. Rev. 263, 272-78 (1965).
259. Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1960).
260. The leading text on this subject is GRiAM & DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS,
PRINCIPLES AND TncHNIQUS 405-585 (4th ed. 1962). Innumerable other works exist;
of particular interest are: Bown, EsrAT PLANNING AND TAxATioN 495-520 (1957);
Casner, op. cit. supra note 192, at 942-54; Casey, Valuation Factor in Tax Planning,
N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON FED. TAX 555 (1962); Greenberger, Valuation Problems in
Dispositions of Property, N.Y.U. 14TH INST. ON F4D. TAX 409 (1956) ; Hrusoff, supra
note 258, at 278-83; Tierney, A New Approach to the Valuation of Common Stock
of Closely Held Companies, 17 J. TAXATION 14 (1962) ; Weed, Techniques in Valua-
tion of Close Corporations, N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON Fto. TAX 597 (1962) ; and for the
most recent thinking of the Tax Court see Estate of Matthew I. Heinold, 24 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 26 (1965).
FALL 1965]
35
Hrusoff: Election, Operation and Termination of a Subchapter S Corporation
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1965
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
to the beneficiaries before a gift tax will be imposed. The problem
exists whether the donor transfers ordinary or Subchapter S stock.
It seems that the valuation of a subchapter S corporation should be
little, if any, different from any other closely held corporation. How-
ever one difference exists. The value of Subchapter S stock will be
depressed if the corporation has distributed earnings to the decedent
during the year and then the executor fails to make a timely election.
The corporation then will have to pay taxes on its entire income for
the year, reducing the value of the stock by the amount of the tax.2"'
If the donor's principal aim is the reduction of his estate and
if control is a problem, a Subchapter S corporation will hamper him.
But if he desires to spread income among his children while reducing
his estate, a Subchapter S corporation will serve him well. This is
especially so if he is the sole owner and if control is no problem. No
other program allows substantial gifts which reduce both current
income and the eventual estate tax. On balance, the possibility that
a corporation's owners may wish to give stock to their children should
not stand in the way of an election; if anything, it may promote it.
III.
SALES AND LIQUIDATIONS
The final section is concerned with the so-called "termination
transactions." It attempts to describe the effect on the corporation
and the shareholders in each of three common situations. For this
reason it is divided into three parts. Part A deals with the share-
holder who sells his Subchapter S stock to another individual; B
is concerned with a sale of a portion of the corporation's assets; C
treats liquidations, including bankruptcies. Although sales and liquida-
tions under Subchapter S are, in the majority of cases, taxed in the
same manner as similar corporate transactions, there are several im-
portant differences. These differences warrant discussion.
A. Sales and Transfers
The corporation itself is not affected by the sale or transfer of
its stock so long as the new owner agrees that the election shall con-
tinue. Refusal, of course, terminates the election. At the share-
holder level both purchaser and seller should treat this sale as they
would any other transfer; it would be different if retained earnings
c.tld be transferred, but, as they cannot, there is no reason to handle
261. Sce Pden, s:!pra note 187, at 1061.
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this sale differently from any other. Earnings that have not been with-
drawn when the stock is sold are lost. As the buyer realizes he can-
not obtain these retained earnings except as dividends he would be
foolish to pay a premium for them. The selling shareholder is paying
regular income for capital gain if he fails to withdraw earnings that
he has had taxed to him at regular income rates. Therefore, if at
all possible, retained earnings should be withdrawn prior to sale.
B. Capital Gains
Section 1375 allows long-term gain from the sale of property
not held primarily for sale in the ordinary course of trade26 2 (not in
excess of earnings and profits) to be passed through to the share-
holders.263 This gain is included in their income in the same
manner as if they, not the corporation, held title to the property which
was sold. Capital gains are not set-off against operating or capital
losses; in fact, capital losses do not pass through to Subchapter S
shareholders.26 4 On balance shareholders are given a break. They
are allowed to take capital gains into their income at the 25 percent
maximum rates while applying losses against ordinary income taxed at
50, 60 or 70 percent. Due to the requirement that gain must be dis-
tributed in the year it is received, a certain amount of difficulty was
always encountered. If a corporation selling property early in the
year distributed the proceeds at this time, and then later in the year
experienced losses, the capital gain would be converted to ordinary
income. The corporation that waited until its books were closed had
difficulty distributing the proceeds before the year ended. Congress
added paragraph (e) to section 1375 last year265 to avoid this dilemma.
Section (e) (1) allows a distribution made within 75 days after the
close of the corporation's taxable year to be treated as if it were made
before the year ended. All that is required is that the distribution
must be pursuant to a board resolution; the resolution, which must
be made in the year of sale, need only order that some of the antici-
pated capital gain be distributed. Section (e) (2) deals with the share-
holders. It requires all shareholders at the close of the year to main-
tain their position until the distribution occurs. Section 1375 allows
the owners of a corporation to utilize an election when they antici-
pate a sale resulting in substantial gain. They substitute a capital
262. § 1375(a) (1) ; § 1221 and Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(1)(b) (1957), further define
this provision.
263. Ibid.
264. Ibid. This does not mean that shareholders are prohibited from sustaining
capital loss upon the sale or exchange of Subchapter S stock to the extent provided
by § 1211(b). Anthony Granota, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1633 (1963).
265. 78 Stat. 112 (1964). See S. Rep. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 145-46 (1964).
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gains tax for a capital gains tax followed by an ordinary dividend
by electing. The saving can be substantial. However, as seems to
be the case with every other section, there is an exception. No gain
may be passed through if the shareholders are using an election to
avoid having their operation taxed as a collapsible corporation. In
this area Subchapter S is consistent with the collapsible corporation
and collapsible partnership provisions. 26 6 Thus, gain from a sale that




One of the principal advantages of Subchapter S is its liberal
liquidation provisions. If correctly used, substantial sums can be saved.
At the outset it is now well settled that a corporation may elect even
though it is in the process of liquidation.6 8 Once an election is made
the corporation that sells its assets and distributes the proceeds will
incur only one tax - a capital gains tax at the shareholder level. The
non-electing corporation will be taxed on the sale and the shareholders
will be taxed again when the proceeds are distributed. 269 Thus, a
timely election eliminates one tax. Moreover, a corporation liquidating
after election, in contrast to one bowing out under § 337,270 is not
penalized if it sells its property on an installment basis ;271 this fact
alone may sometimes make a Subchapter S liquidation superior to
a § 333 or § 337 liquidation.
The election may become even more profitable, in the proper
circumstances. Thus, if the corporation is operating in the red, all
operating losses sustained during liquidation may be passed on to the
shareholders; in contrast, a similar corporation dissolved under § 337
must set off operating losses against capital gains. By coupling a Sub-
chapter S election with a § 337 liquidation, the operating losses can
be passed on to the shareholders, who will in turn deduct them from
ordinary income. It is not surprising that the temporary regulations
prevented an election when in the process of liquidation.272  Had
266. § 751.
267. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1375-1(c) (8), 1.1375-1(d) (1960) ; see also 7 MERTENS,
LAW op FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION § 41B.35 (1962) ; Alexrad, Recent Developments
in Collapsible Corporations, 36 TAxEs 893, 906 (1958) ; Note, Tax-Free Sales in
Liquidation under Section 337, 76 HARV. L. Rev. 780, 798-800 (1963).
268. Hauptman v. Director of Internal Revenue, 309 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 909 (1963).
269. An exception is made if the corporation qualifies under § 333.
270. § 337(b) (B)-(C) ; cf. Family Record Plan, Inc., 36 T.C. 305 (1961), aff'd
on other grounds, 309 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 910 (1963).
271. The installment sale presents no problem for the tax is only imposed on the
proceeds as they are received. § 1375 (a) (2).
272. Proposed Reg. § 1.1372-1 (a) (2), 24 Fed. Reg. 1795-96 (1959).
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they allowed the stockholders to elect without meeting a multitude of
restrictions but denied the right to terminate until two years after
election, they would have better served the Treasury's purpose. It
may now be too late to correct this defect without a change in the
statute.
273
For the corporation to sell its assets tax-free under § 337, it
must formally adopt a plan of liquidation,274 and subsequently carry
out the plan within a 12 month period ;275 a sale followed by a plan
will not do.27 Caution is called for in treating this area, for recently
the Service has attempted to restrict the deductions allowed under
§ 337,277 with some success. It seems established that the taxpayer
will be allowed legal expenses incurred in a complete liquidation,278
and may deduct state liquidating taxes assessed against the company ;271
but the majority of cases have held bad debt reserves taxable as in-
come.280  Additionally, the Commissioner has ruled that previously
deducted maintenance - such as coal to heat a building, or small hand
tools with which to maintain it - must be included as income.281
This ruling has not as yet been tested.
Perhaps the most interesting of all these § 337 conflicts is now
being waged over the Commissioner's contention that a sale before the
end of an asset's depreciable life, for a sum in excess of remaining
depreciation plus salvage, works a disallowance of depreciation taken
during the year of sale. The absence of a logical foundation to this
273. Cf. Hauptman v. Director of Internal Revenue, supra note 268.
274. § 337(a) (1) ; see generally Rice, Problems in Section 337 Liquidations, N.Y.U.
20'rH INST. ON FaD. TAX 939 (1962); Note, Tax-Free Sales in Liquidations under
Section 337, 76 HARV. L. REv. 780, 782-90 (1963).
275. § 337(a) (2).
276. Wendell v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v.
Diversified Servs., Inc., 312 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1963); Wood Harmon Corp. v.
United States, 311 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1963) ; J. C. Penney Co. v. Commissioner, 312
F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1962); The Covered Wagon, Inc., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 427,
641 (1965).
277. See Commissioner v. South Lakes Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963).
,278. Gravois Planing Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1962);
but cf. Gen. Bancshares Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 712 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 832 (1964).
279. Commissioner v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 318 F.2d 658 (4th Cir. 1963)
Hawaiian Trust Co. v. United States, 291 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1961) ; City Bank of
Wash., 38 T.C. 713 (1962), acq. 1965 INT. Rtv. BULL. No. 1, at 7; Bertha G. McDonald,
36 T.C. 1108 (1961), acq. 1965 INT. Rev. BULL. No. 1, at 9.
280. Arcadia Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1962);
West Seattle Nat'l Bank v. United States, 288 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Citizens Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 154 Ct. Cl. 305, 290 F.2d 932 (1961) ; Estate of
Heinz Schmidt, 42 T.C. 1131 (1964) ; contra, James M. Pierce Corp. v. Commissioner,
326 F.2d 68 (8th Cir. 1964); cf. Calavo, Inc. v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 650 (9th
Cir. 1962) ; Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 223 F. Su4pp. 134 (S.D. Cal.
1963). See BITTKER, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 285 (1959) ; Note, Tax-Free Sales in Liquidation under Section 337, 76 HARV.
L. Rev. 780, 795-98 (1963).
281. Rev. Rul. 61-214, 1961-2 CuM. BULL. 60; see Gutkin & Beck, Section 337;
IRS Wrong in Taxing, at Time of Liquidation, Items Previously Deducted, 17 J.
TAXATION 146 (1962).
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contention has not prevented its acceptance in some quarters, In 1947
it was rejected by the Tax Court, 2 ' but eleven years later, in Cohn
v. United States,2 3 the Sixth Circuit accepted the Commissioner's
argument; and when the question was relitigated before the Tax
Court, it followed Cohn rather than adhering to its earlier decision. 4
On appeal the Tax Court's decision was affirmed by the Second
Circuit; 285 but late in 1964 the Tax Court again reversed itself and
ruled for the taxpayer. 2 "0  Hopefully, by early 1966 the problem will
be resolved, for the Supreme Court has agreed to settle the question.28 7
282. Wier Long Leaf Lumber Co., 9 T.C. 990, 999 (1947), rev'd on other grounds,
173 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1949).
283. 259 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1958).
284. Randolph D. Rouse, 39 T.C. 70 (1962), acq. 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 5; Edward
V. Lane, 37 T.C. 188 (1961); Fribourg Nay. Co., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1533 (1962).
285. Fribourg Nay. Co. v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1964); accord,
United States v. Motorlease Corp., 334 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Killebrew v. United
States, 234 F. Supp. 481 (E.D. Tenn. 1964).
286. C. L. Nichols, 43 T.C. 135 (1964) ; Harry Trotz, 43 T.C. 127 (1964) ; Smith
Leasing Co., 43 T.C. 37 (1964) ; Macabe Co., 42 T.C. 1105 (1964); Palmaneda
Adams, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1743 (1964).
287. Certiorari was granted in Fribourg Nav. Co. v. Commissioner, 379 U.S. 998
(1965), and has been requested in United States v. Motorlease Corp., 33 U.S.L. W"K
3203 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1964) (No. 685). While it is difficult to predict the course of action
that will be taken by the Supreme Court, Judge Devitt sitting in S.&A. Co. v. United
States, 218 F. Supp. 677, 685 (D. Minn. 1963), affd, 338 F.2d 629 (8th Cir. 1964),
seems to have most clearly stated the correct conclusion:
It appears to me that the distinction drawn by the Tax Court is correct. [referring
to Wies Long Leaf Lumber Co., 9 T.C. 990, 999]. It is plain from the decision
that a sale of an asset at the end of its useful life for an amount in excess of its
undepreciated cost at the beginning of the year of sale will justify a redetermina-
tion of salvage value. On the other hand, it is equally clear that the Tax Court
held that sale of assets prior to the end of 'useful life' at a price in excess of
undepreciated cost at the beginning of the year of the sale does not justify a
redetermination of salvage value because the excess of price over cost is mere
appreciation in value.
Judge Devitt by no means stands alone. See Fribourg Nay. Co. v. Commissioner, 335
F.2d 15, 18 (2d Cir. 1964) (Moore, J., dissenting) ; United States v. Motorlease Corp.,
334 F.2d 617, 619 (2d Cir. 1964) (Waterman, J., dissenting) ; Wyoming Builders,
Inc. v. United States, 227 F. Supp. 534 (D. Wyo. 1964) ; Motorlease Corp. v. United
States, 215 F. Supp. 356 (D. Conn. 1963), rev'd, 334 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Kimball
Gas Prods. Co. v. United States, 63-2 U.S.T.C. f[ 9507 (W.D. Tex. 1962). This
problem is discussed by Walther, Depreciation in the Year of Sale: Recent Develop-
lients, 51 A.B.A.J. 281 (1965) and noted in 53 Ggo. L.J. 831 (1965) ; 50 VA. L. Rzv.
1431 (1964).
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